



**MIGRATION, EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC**

**COUNTRY REPORT NO. 2  
COOK ISLANDS**

**John Connell**


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**Front cover:**

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## Preface

This report is one of a series of country reports covering all the countries in the South Pacific Commission area that have been produced as part of the Migration, Employment and Development in the South Pacific project. This project is administered jointly by the South Pacific Commission and the International Labour Organisation and was established in April 1981 with funds provided by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. The project, which is based in Noumea, covered all the countries and territories in the South Pacific Commission area and also investigated migration from the region into Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States of America. The series of specific country reports is listed on the back cover of this report.

In consultation with the SPC, the ILO appointed Mr John Connell as a resident expert to co-ordinate the implementation of the project. Within the SPC, Drs Ko Groenewegen provided guidance on technical and administrative aspects of the project. Work on the preparation of the reports was undertaken by Mr John Connell with some early research assistance from M. Jean-Marie Delmas and the secretarial assistance of Ms Maeva Betham. Advice, comments and assistance, both technical and administrative, were also provided by the ILO's Labour and Population Team for Asia and the Pacific (LAPTAP). The project is indebted to many individuals within the countries, in SPC and elsewhere, who helped in the compilation, analysis and assessment of the data and related reports, and these are acknowledged in specific country reports.

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## Contents

Introduction	1
Economy	2
Employment	9
Population	20
Internal Migration	27
Urbanisation	31
International Migration	33
The Rationale of Migration	40
The Impact of Emigration	45
Conclusion	52

## List of Tables

1	Occupational status of the economically active population by sex, 1966-81	10
2	Distribution of the actively engaged population by Sector, 1966-81	12
3	Regional distribution of the labour force by economic sector, 1981	14
4	Economically Active Population by Industry Major Division and Island, 1981	15
5	Wage and Salary Employment. Southern Group, 1979	16
6	Cook Islands. Employed Population by Employer Sector and Island, 1981	17
7	Rarotonga. Wage and Salary Employment, 1979-1981	18
8	Population at Successive Censuses by Islands (1902-1976)	23
9	Population Change - 1976-1981	24
10	Present Residence and Birth Place	26
11	Inter-island and inter-regional Migration, 1976	28
12	Lifetime Migration	29
13	Internal Migration, 1966-1971 (Population 5+)	30
14	Internal Migration from Rarotonga, 1966-1971 (Population 5+)	31
15	'Urban' and 'Rural' Rarotonga Population	32
16	Net migration and crude net migration rates for Maori and total population, 1966-82	35
17	Cook Islanders in New Zealand	36
18	Lifetime Migration, 1976	38
19	Immigrants, 1966-1971	39



○ Penrhyn  
(Tongareva)

· Rakahanga  
● Manihiki

∴ Pukapuka

· Nassau

∴ Suvarrow

∴ Palmerston


○ Aitutaki

· Manuae  
Takutea · Mitiaro  
Atiu · Mauke

Rarotonga ●

○ Mangaia

0 300 km



RAROTONGA



'Neglecting their gardens the Cook Islanders have sought employment on wages. Many have gone to Avarua not only from the villages of Rarotonga but also from other islands. Here some find work on the wharves, some with the departments of works and agriculture and some in small factories, recently established, making slippers and knitwear for the New Zealand market.... Over 3,000 Cook Islanders have meanwhile taken passage to Auckland and found work in the growing factories there. Moreover with the neglect of native food crops...and with the diminution of the export trade, not only housing but also diet and health have suffered' (K.B.Cumberland, South West Pacific, Auckland, 1954/1968:310).

The fifteen Cook Islands have a land area of only 235 sq.kms. and are spread over 15 degrees latitude and a massive 1,360,000 sq.kms. of the Pacific Ocean. The main island is Rarotonga, some 3,000 kms. north-east of Auckland, which has about a quarter of the land area in the Cook Islands and is a high volcanic island, rising to 652 m. The southern group of islands are generally 'high islands' of principally volcanic origin with a diverse vegetation; however Manuae is a coral atoll, Aitutaki is only part volcanic and only Mangaia which rises to 169 m. is genuinely 'high'. The northern group are all atolls although Nassau is essentially a coral outcrop. Palmerston, although closer to the southern group, is classified with the northern group, as a remote atoll. There are therefore significant differences between the larger islands of the south and the small atolls of the north. The country is characterised by extreme fragmentation, with a small population distributed over a number of widely dispersed islands, most like the Federated States of Micronesia or even nearby French Polynesia, a situation that presents major problems for national development. Cyclones are an occasional threat to agriculture as are droughts, such as that on Penrhyn in mid-1982 which necessitated the emergency airlifting of water.

Cook Islanders are Polynesians with a close affinity to both French Polynesians and the Maori population of New Zealand; the people are usually referred to as Cook Island Maoris and the language as Cook Islands Maori. However, over the course of the last century there has been considerable racial mixing, especially on Rarotonga; both the first two premiers of the Cook Islands have had European names and ancestry and part-Maoris dominate the top economic and political positions. Chieftainship was more highly developed in the south and traditional chieftainship remains of some slight significance and is recognised in the existence of an upper house, the House of Ariki which was established in 1966 as a consultative body and can make recommendations to the Legislative Assembly principally on issues of customs, traditions and land tenure. In general Polynesian culture is more strongly retained on the northern islands although throughout the country mission and administration influence has resulted in many changes. Pukapuka, settled from western rather than eastern Polynesia, has linguistic and cultural affiliations with Samoa to a greater extent than any other island.

The Cook Islands did not exist as a political entity until European times and until New Zealand annexation in 1901 the islands were very much distinct entities with separate histories. Captain Cook 'discovered' some of the islands in the 1770s hence their name; others, both in the northern and southern group, were not discovered by Europeans until the 19th Century.

However, the two northern atolls of Pukapuka and Rakahanga were both sighted by Spanish explorers, respectively Mendana in 1594 and Quiros in 1606, thus the contemporary re-discovery of all the islands took more than two centuries. Some of the atolls were unpopulated at the time of European contact and may never have had an ancient Polynesian population; Palmerston was only populated after 1862 and then by an Englishman, William Marsters, and his Polynesian wives. Suvarrow was only occasionally populated in the last couple of centuries, but most recently by a sole European, Tom Neale, who has a unique place in the population history of the atoll (see Table Eight). From 1823 onwards the islands came under the spiritual, and largely temporal, control of the London Missionary Society missionaries. In 1888 a British protectorate was declared on Rarotonga and in 1901 the Cook Islands became part of New Zealand. Late colonisation indicates that in some respects the Cook Islands were 'the crumbs that were left after the choicer morcels had been swallowed up' (Oliver, 1961:220-221). A Legislative Council was set up in 1946 and a Legislative Assembly was first elected in 1965. A new constitution then came into force giving the Cook Islands internal self government with New Zealand retaining responsibility for defence and some aspects of foreign affairs so that, like Niue (Country Report No.11), the Cook Islands are an internally self-governing state in free association with New Zealand and Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens. Cook Islands politics is dominated by two political parties, the Cook Islands Party (still associated with the late Mr Albert Henry) and the Democratic Party, which currently forms the government, with Sir Thomas Davis as Prime Minister. In recent years the Cook Islands has increasingly conducted its foreign affairs, independent of New Zealand involvement; in a series of recent constitutional amendments the Legislative Assembly has been re-named 'Parliament' and the Premier 'Prime Minister' to reflect some evolution towards Sovereign status (Hayes, 1983) yet understanding of development in the Cook Islands demands recognition of its close social and economic links with New Zealand. The number of parliamentary seats was recently increased to 24 one of which is for Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand.

The extent of migration and hence population change in the Cook Islands in recent years has been considerable hence this theme has received considerable attention in much recent literature, notably that of Hayes (1982, 1983), where some aspects of the topic are analysed in greater depth than can be undertaken here. This chapter therefore attempts to summarise, analyse and reconsider some aspects of contemporary studies rather than to duplicate them. Some elements of a more detailed examination are impossible because of the non-availability of a number of New Zealand theses on the migration of Cook Islanders to New Zealand.

### Economy

The Cook Islands has an economy that is highly dependent on New Zealand. The major productive sector of the economy in terms of employment is agriculture, where production is for both a domestic and export market, but there has been some decline in this sector despite government attempts at expansion and subsidisation. Agricultural development has been restricted by out-migration, high transport costs, inadequate transport infrastructure (in part resulting from the removal of wide-bodied jets but also from irregular shipping services), land tenure constraints and the low status of agricultural employment. However, throughout the country the only real potential for locally-based economic development lies in agriculture and fisheries. There are no known mineral or modern energy resources and

the cost of imported energy supplies has resulted in some interest being attached to more appropriate energy resources and solar power has been introduced in a number of places, for example to forty houses on Mitiaro in 1983. There are no forests although forestry experiments were begun in June 1982. It is probable that there is potential for forestry development in some of the islands in the southern group. The fact that the northern islands are atolls severely limits their potential for diverse agricultural development and their small size limits the potential of other kinds of economic development.

The traditional agricultural system is based on the cultivation of root crops, in a similar manner to that of other eastern Polynesian islands, with a much greater diversity of production on the high islands rather than the atolls. Irrigated terraced taro cultivation was widespread on the southern islands and although terraces have largely disappeared because of the orientation of agriculture towards export-crop production, migration and the withdrawal of labour from the agricultural sector (Allen, 1971) taro terraces remain in use even in Rarotonga, and are some of the few remaining examples of this form of intensive cultivation in the South Pacific. Despite the decline of the traditional agricultural economy, root crop production remains important, especially in the northern group, the principal crops being taro and cassava. Taro is marketed in Rarotonga and New Zealand especially from Mangaia, because of the seasonal advantages that tropical production provides. The decline of traditional root crop production and the increase in cash cropping 'has been a change from stability to instability' (Taylor, 1980:83) characterised by loss of autonomy and environmental deterioration, resulting in declining health and nutrition, a growing dependence on imported foods and energy and reduced social stability (op cit:83-84), trends which are familiar in other parts of the South Pacific but are here emphasized by falling population levels and the absolute reduction in extent and significance of the traditional agricultural economy.

The principal export crops are bananas, copra and, increasingly, more temperate vegetables. Citrus has been the longest established cash crop after copra, hence Bellam's depiction of the Cook Islands as a 'citrus colony' (1981), and is principally centred on Rarotonga with extensions on Aitutaki, Atiu and Mauke. Most of the annual production is now exported as juice which until 1982 was canned and exported but is now exported in bulk. Replanting has not been carried out and low returns have resulted in disinvestment in citrus production and the abandonment of some small groves. Production is not currently increasing although citrus juice exports are third in value after bananas and copra. Pineapple production is centred on the islands of Atiu and Mangaia; on Mangaia especially large areas of land are available for pineapple production because of the retained traditional land tenure system. Until 1982 most pineapples were canned on Rarotonga but canned pineapple could not compete in New Zealand with other imports hence fresh pineapples are now exported although there have been recent moves to reduce the pineapple acreage because of high transport costs. This has resulted in a dramatic decline in pineapple exports valued, in all forms, at NZ\$675,000 in 1980 to NZ\$34,000 in 1982, a decline which has been a significant problem for the two principal pineapple-growing islands. Banana production is concentrated on Aitutaki; export quantities are restricted by the availability of refrigeration facilities on ships and there is strong competition in the export market, although produce is exported to American Samoa and French Polynesia as well as New Zealand. Nevertheless exports are increasing and bananas are now the single most important agricultural produce exported from the Cook Islands. Within the last two or three years

there has been some expansion of taro exports and a more dramatic expansion of more temperate vegetables such as avocado pears, beans, eggplant and capsicum, each of which is now of greater value than pineapples. There are proposals for vanilla production on Atiu. The only agricultural export production in the northern group is copra, hence its importance there and its consequent maintained stability, benefiting the country as a whole. In recent years there has been an enforced movement away from the export of higher value processed products to exports of unprocessed agricultural products, a major disincentive to further investment in the agricultural sector.

Agricultural development policy has generally emphasized plantation type development activities through indirect support and the encouragement of a movement away from domestic food production (cf. Taylor, 1980) but more recently there has been a greater official emphasis on family farming with individual entrepreneurs being seen as the basic social units for agricultural expansion, and maximum self-sufficiency in food production being the primary object of policy (Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture, 1979). Approaches to agricultural development are currently being reconsidered in the light of a major consultancy report undertaken in 1981, the formulation of a Development Plan and changes in airfreight availability. It is apparent that considerable agricultural development opportunities do exist, both for external markets and within the country; in the Rarotonga market taro prices are high and the market appears undersupplied (Ward and Proctor, 1979:373-4) although the constraints to expansion of production are considerable (Taylor, 1980:82-83). Development strategies are currently emphasizing tourism and marine resources rather than agriculture (Ingram, 1981).

Land tenure in the Cook Islands varies from place to place but is characterised by patrilineal land ownership and the prohibition of alienation of land. Traditional land tenure systems were modified by the introduction of New Zealand legislation which introduced bilineal inheritance, in which land title was awarded to all descendants, male and female, of a previous owner. This has led towards the individualisation of land ownership, problems of multiple ownership, the reduction in size of land holdings and hence difficulties in establishing large-scale agricultural development schemes because all land title holders must agree to the leasing of land. Out-migration and the constraints of land tenure have resulted in estimates that as much as 50% of potential agricultural land in Rarotonga, and higher proportions on the southern outer islands, may not be in productive use. However, the existing land tenure provides security and has effectively prevented the growth of large landowners or a landless group. On Pukapuka and Mangaia, however, the traditional Polynesian communal land tenure systems have never been significantly changed hence, in the rather unusual situation of high emigration, the absence of landowners has created fewer problems for agricultural development.

The prospects for a greater degree of self-reliant development in the Cook Islands are largely dependent on the prospects for agricultural development, hence the proliferation of reports on agricultural development in the past decade. Yet agricultural development suffers from many fundamental problems resulting from both internal and external factors. Firstly, the problems of transportation (especially for the export of commodities) are considerable, hence returns to agricultural producers are often low, especially in the northern group and most islands outside Rarotonga and Aitutaki. Consequently there have been many reports which

have concluded along the lines of one on Mitiaro that 'urgent action will be required to supplement the earnings of the people or there may be undesirable depletion of the population by migration to Rarotonga or even to New Zealand' (Hugh, 1970:14). The problems of 'supplementation' largely remain. Secondly, the depletion of labour by out-migration has hampered some kinds of development and resulted in declines in production that increase the unit cost of transport. Thirdly, 'agriculture is considered a menial task and is generally looked down upon as a degrading type of work' (Hugh, 1970:14) hence recommendations have invariably suggested the greater incorporation of agriculture in the school curriculum. This attitude has, however, resulted in a shortage of innovative labour within the agricultural sector. Fourthly, commodity prices vary considerably so that, at different times, different crops have been recommended for the same islands, causing considerable local uncertainty over the appropriate strategies for increasing cash incomes.

Cook Islands fisheries are largely restricted to traditional semi-subsistence activities; in the northern group this is mainly within lagoons and, in the south, reef fisheries. Fisheries development has considerable potential principally because of the size of the Exclusive Economic Zone but is restricted in the outer islands by a lack of storage and transport facilities hence considerable recent investment has been made into fish storage facilities. In 1981 the government invested substantial sums on fishing infrastructure on Palmerston and on Rakahanga. Pearl shelling has been a source of income on both Penrhyn (Tongareva) and Manihiki but has not yet realised its full potential; exports of pearlshells, two-thirds of which were to Japan, were valued at NZ\$165,000 in 1982. Aitutaki is seeded with trochus. However, the fisheries situation has changed only slightly from 1975 when its potential lay 'in limbo whilst Japanese and Koreans reap a rich harvest from our waters' (Davis, 1975:75). The uncertain future of the American Samoan cannery, transport problems, the decline of long-line fishing and a shortage of manpower and expertise (Cook Islands News, 20 July 1982) have all hampered development. However substantial tuna fishing was generated for the first time in 1980 from the licensing of Korean longline vessels; locally based commercial ventures have had limited success, although due to factors other than the lack of tuna resources, such as isolation, limited baitfish resources, poor harbour facilities, marketing infrastructure, high fuel costs or vessel inadequacies. The most recent surveys show that tuna are abundant, at least in the northern group, but that baitfish resources are limited. Prospects for fisheries development are limited, especially beyond domestic requirements (Lawson and Kearney, 1982) although there is an unsatisfied demand for fresh fish in Rarotonga and a major programme for the establishment of fish aggregation devices to meet part of this demand. Nevertheless the significance of fisheries lies in its clear potential as the only means of substantially increasing income levels in the northern group and its use of local resources. There has been substantial fish production at Penrhyn, but great problems of marketing (especially irregular services and the unavailability of refrigerated containers). The importance of fisheries was recognised in 1983 when the Cook Islands Party government divided agriculture and fisheries to set up a new Ministry of Marine Resources.

There is a small manufacturing industry in Rarotonga, with free access to New Zealand markets, primarily concerned with food processing and clothing manufacture, alongside import substitution industries such as bread and soft drink production. Although there are policies encouraging industrial development and foreign investment the small, fragmented (and

declining) size of the domestic market, lack of raw materials and costs of labour and transportation are disadvantages to potential investors. However, under the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS) industries involved in sheet metal, fibreglass products and sawmilling have been established. The value of manufactured exports increased through the 1970s despite declines in manufacturing employment but export industries remain heavily protected. Nevertheless clothing and footwear exports alone were valued at NZ\$2,012,000 in 1982, some 40% of all exports from the country. In 1983 there were three major, and several minor, clothing factories in Rarotonga. Handicraft production has never been of major significance and in 1982 handicraft exports, most of which went to Hawaii, were only valued at \$4,642.

Expansion of tourism followed the completion of the airport on Rarotonga in 1973 but is heavily dependent on overseas hotel ownership and the import of food and drinks; however, the main luxury hotel, the Rarotongan, was recently purchased outright by the Cook Islands government and tourism is currently the highest priority for development in the country (Ingram, 1981; Cook Islands News, 23 July 1982). The number of tourists actually declined from 1980 to 1982, when there were 22,000, hence attempts are being made to develop a market in North America, rather than become over-dependent on New Zealand which currently supplies more than 50% of all tourists (so that the present success of tourism is related to fluctuations in the New Zealand economy, airline fares and frequency). Despite the 'leakage' of earnings from tourism, estimated at around 40%, revenue from tourism has risen steadily and was \$3.3 million in 1975 so that (after New Zealand aid) tourism was the major source of overseas income in the country (Okotai, 1980:170). However, the direct impact of tourism is almost entirely confined to Rarotonga and, to a lesser extent, Aitutaki (where a new resort centre has recently been completed by the government) and this emphasis is likely to increase rather than decrease in the future.

As is common in the small countries of the South Pacific the sale of postage stamps makes an important contribution to revenue; however, the Cook Islands has extended the usual system by separately issuing stamps for the islands of Penrhyn and Aitutaki, which are distributed from those islands. Cooks Islands coinage is also marketed, and earnings from stamps and coins were expected to reach \$750,000 in 1982-3. In 1981 the government passed the Offshore Banking Act to encourage foreign banks to locate tax-free in the country as tax haven facilities are developed, a situation which is expected to generate a small amount of local employment (and increased spending in the economy) but will largely produce revenue from registration fees.

Although the value of exports from the Cook Islands almost doubled between 1976 (NZ\$2,261,000) and 1980 (NZ\$4,190,000) this was offset by an even greater increase in imports (\$13,362,000 in 1976 and \$18,611,000 in 1980) so that the trade deficit widened significantly. By 1982 the total value of exports had grown to \$4,980,000 and by 1981 the value of imports was \$26,616,000 further widening the trade gap. The main exports are clothing and footwear, followed by fresh food, processed food and copra, thus manufacturing industry plays an important role in the economy (albeit a largely protected role). Fresh food exports have been increasing but problems of transportation may limit further expansion unless more high-value, low weight crops (such as macadamia nuts) can be established or new markets developed. Copra, as elsewhere, suffers from fluctuating markets and, in the Cook Islands, from the vagaries of transport in the northern islands where its importance as the only cash crop is considerable.

The largest single category of imports is food (28% of all imports with beverages and tobacco, in 1981, a very high figure for the South Pacific), indicating the significance of any move towards self-reliance in food production. The most rapidly expanding import is oil, the cost of which went up four-fold between 1976 and 1980, which increases the already massive transport problem in a country consisting of small and scattered islands; this problem is accentuated by containerisation and the decline of small shipping and emphasises the necessity for greater self-reliance.

Almost all exports (93% in 1982) are to New Zealand and most imports are from New Zealand; almost all foreign aid comes from New Zealand. Policy favours the protection and expansion of New Zealand markets whilst placing emphasis on the development of new markets within the Pacific, such as in the relatively developed economies of American Samoa and French Polynesia. In 1982 agricultural produce valued at \$28,737 was exported to American Samoa and \$4,427 to French Polynesia. There has been some movement towards the diversification of aid sources, especially to incorporate UN agencies, but also other European sources. New Zealand continues to play the major role in all significant economic issues, including substantial direct budgetary subsidies, which have steadily increased through the 1970's. In 1981-82 New Zealand aid reached \$8.4 million and for 1982-83 was \$9.2 million, of which \$7.24 million was for development and \$1.96 for recurrent expenditure (Cook Islands News, 24 July 1982).

There are considerable differences in the provision of infrastructure between Rarotonga and all other islands and between the southern group and the northern group. Although all the populated islands (including Palmerston) have primary schools, high schools are located in Rarotonga (which has the only school that caters for Form 6), Aitutaki, Mangaia and Atiu, all in the southern group. A Teacher's College (which closed in 1983, possibly for several years) and the USP centre are also situated on Rarotonga. Modern hospitals are situated on Rarotonga and Aitutaki and all dental services are on Rarotonga; health services are maintained on Rarotonga at levels similar to those in New Zealand and health is better than in most other parts of the South Pacific although degenerative diseases are increasingly common, especially on Rarotonga and diseases of the circulatory system (particularly heart-failure and cardiovascular diseases) are now the principal causes of death throughout the country (Hayes, 1983). There are now extensive health and nutrition education programmes in the country and sporting amenities are given high national priority.

The only paved roads are on Rarotonga as are all but two of the major hotels. Transportation is centred on Rarotonga which has modern international jet services; local air services serve all the islands of the southern group. The northern group has airstrips at Penrhyn and Rakahanga (and one is proposed for Manihiki) and air services commenced in 1983. Aitutaki, Rarotonga, Atiu and Mauke each have electricity and reticulated water supplies. In the 1970s there was considerable inequality in the distribution of resources; political bias favoured some islands rather than others to the extent that Aitutaki, Mauke and Atiu were over-supplied with electricity and other services (Crocombe, 1979:46). Although the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has five offices in the southern group (on Rarotonga, Atiu, Aitutaki, Mangaia, Mauke and Mitiaro) there is no office in the northern group, which is administered from Rarotonga. The enormous distances between thinly populated islands emphasize the difficulties in equalising service provision and the distribution of opportunities of all kinds. As Walsh concludes, development policies,

'seem to have accentuated the economic inequalities between urban Rarotonga and the rural regions and between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. Improved social services, better communication between the islands and with New Zealand, money remitted from relatives overseas and in Rarotonga, the development of tourism and the provision of more government tertiary employment in Rarotonga, did little to reduce regional and Cook Island-New Zealand economic inequalities, and may indeed have heightened awareness of them' (1982:142).

In 1983 a summary of the first Cook Islands Development Plan was released although the Plan itself has not yet been finalised and made more widely available. The guidelines for the plan were formulated as a set of eight points, of which the first is of major significance in terms of the present report; they were:

1. To raise the prosperity of the people of the Cook Islands and to encourage them to remain within their home islands.
2. To attain a large measure of economic independence.
3. To ensure that economic development proceeds in a manner compatible with valued aspects of the Cook Islands way of life.
4. To ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of development.
5. To increase the level of participation of Cook Islanders in the development process.
6. To conserve our natural resources and the environment.
7. To strengthen the sense of national identity.
8. To co-operate closely with Pacific neighbours in economic affairs and other matters of mutual interest (Cook Islands, 1983).

The heavy emphasis on a greater degree of self-reliance, equalising of development opportunities over space and attempts to more strongly emphasize a Cook Islands identity (implicitly therefore involving stronger links with other South Pacific countries rather than with New Zealand) are relatively familiar strategies incorporated in the development plans of other areas within the South Pacific. The extent to which these ideals can be converted into realistic strategies remains to be seen, although it was anticipated that the plan would stress such issues as economic diversification, the rationalisation of transport, restraint of the public sector, the development of all resources (including marine resources, tourism, manufacturing, agriculture and developing tax haven laws), the attraction of project aid (rather than general budgetary support) and the strengthening of inter-sectoral linkages. Nor are all the guidelines mutually supportives; trade-offs exist, particularly between, for example, points one and eight (L. Demery, pers. comm, 1983), or points one and six. There is no indication that the plan will give particular attention to the northern group of outer islands, and the redistribution of development opportunities has never had high priority in the Cook Islands. The Plan did however propose an Outer Island Development Programme but, in the Cook Islands, 'outer islands' are all but Rarotonga. Since the Cook Islands have inadequate resources to maintain current development levels, without substantial external support (both direct, and as the result of migration, tourism and trade) the attempt to move towards greater self-reliance and/or ties with other South Pacific countries would be fraught with major difficulties.

The Cook Islands Development Bank was established in 1978 and operates in the same manner as other Development Banks in the South Pacific, being concerned primarily with the financing of relatively small-scale agricultural, fishing, industrial or commercial development projects. In April 1980 its activities were extended to incorporate the financing of private housing development. In the 1981-2 financial year some 153 non-housing loans were made, the majority of which were to agricultural, fisheries and pearl shell projects. (Cook Islands News, 13 July 1982) and the distribution of loans from the Bank has increasingly favoured the outer islands who received 14% of the grants in 1978-9 and 48% of the grants in 1981-2 (Cook Islands News, 24 July 1982). Although there have been problems in developing projects in the northern group, some projects there have been given financial support, although the larger number of projects, and those that are most heavily capitalised, are primarily in Rarotonga and to a lesser extent in the southern group. The Bank has expressed interest in informing Cook Islanders in New Zealand of development problems and prospects in the Cook Islands, to encourage them to return and/or invest in development projects in the islands, and may consider the possibility of issuing development bonds to stimulate investment within the country.

Because the Cook Islands is part of the New Zealand monetary system it is limited in its ability to use certain fiscal and monetary techniques (such as exchange rate adjustments) for economic management and development purposes (Turua, 1982:7).

### Employment

The post-war years have seen substantial changes in the employment structure of the Cook Islands generally indicated in the movement of labour from the primary production sector into the tertiary sector. The only real primary production sector is agriculture; there are few full-time fishermen in the Cook Islands and no mining activity. In 1945 only 15% of the males over 15 years of age were in productive employment other than agriculture and few women were in formal sector employment. By 1956, of the 'economically active' population, 71% were engaged primarily in agriculture but by 1976 this had fallen to as little as 23%, but there was a major difference between Rarotonga where only 9% of the economically active population were engaged in agriculture compared with 50% on the outer islands. In 1981 however 29% of the economically active population were engaged in agriculture and fishing; again, in Rarotonga the proportion was 9%. Reduced employment in the agricultural sector has not been accompanied by an increase in manufacturing, as might be expected in a 'developing' economy (Hayes, 1979b:8). These changes have been accompanied by changes in the size of the workforce, which reached a peak (6,269) in 1971 but fell in succeeding years, at a faster rate than that of the population as a whole, especially on the outer islands. However by 1981 there had been a revival (Table One) when the total workforce was 5,810. Comparing males and females, in Rarotonga and the outer islands, the only sector that retained its size between 1971 and 1976 was that of females in Rarotonga, because of the expansion in the 1970's of tourist related enterprises (Hayes, 1979b:4). Thus the majority of paid employment and the least agricultural employment (per capita) is on Rarotonga. There are considerable variations in the significance of formal employment from place to place; thus on Rarotonga, and to a lesser extent Aitutaki, most adult males follow a pattern of 'occupational multiplicity' (Hayes, 1982), participating in a number of different activities so that full-time agricultural employment is very limited there.

Table 1. Occupational status of the economically active population by sex, 1966-81.

Status	Male			Female				
	1966	1971	1976	1981	1966	1971	1976	1981
Employer	44	52	45	116	8	11	11	32
Self-employed								
(a) mainly cash	810	730	352	417	247	70	72	76
(b) mainly subsistence	285	364	441	687	86	7	7	180
Total	1,095	1,094	793	1,104	333	77	79	256
Wage and Salary								
(a) full time/permanent	1,813	2,777	-	2,385	859	1,116	-	1,183
(b) part time or casual	835	182	-	147	230	65	-	102
Total	2,648	2,959	2,462	2,532	1,089	1,181	1,165	1,285
Unpaid family worker	144	184	316	156	19	324	159	60
Unemployed	232	217	106	143	171	170	62	126
Other	-	-	128	-	-	-	58	-
TOTAL	4,163	4,506	3,850	4,051	1,620	1,763	1,534	1,759

Source: Hayes, 1983.

Just as the total workforce declined from 1971 so the number of wage and salary earners also declined, from 3,737 in 1966 to 3,627 in 1976 but also increased to 3,817 in 1981. However, whilst the wage and salary earners made up 65% of the total workforce in 1966 by 1976 this proportion had risen to 71% (and 66% in 1981), a high proportion of the total workforce for a South Pacific country. The overall decrease in wage and salary employment masks an increase in Rarotonga and a more rapid decline in the outer islands; this coincides with the reputedly large increase in wage-earning public servants following self-government (Hayes, 1979b:9-10). By 1981 there had been an increase in the number of wage and salary earners, beyond the 1971 level, but mainly in the outer islands and not in Rarotonga (Hayes, 1983). The number of persons engaged in direct production (agriculture and manufacturing) has declined throughout the Cook Islands and this was particularly marked for 'self-employed cash-income' earners whose numbers fell from 758 in 1966 to 310 in 1976 (op cit:11). The occupational structure therefore also changed; the number (and proportion) of agricultural and production workers has declined. In 1966 37% of the labour force were engaged in agriculture and fishing (Table Two); by 1981 this proportion had fallen to 29% (although it had been lower in 1976). As Hayes notes (1983) these changes must be interpreted cautiously since the number and proportion of women included in the primary sector has fluctuated erratically between censuses, as classification procedures and practice have changed. Employment in the secondary sector has always declined since 1966, especially in manufacturing (which declined from 602 in 1966 to 397 in 1981) where this trend has particularly affected female employment. By contrast the numbers of administrative, managerial, clerical and service workers all increased (Hayes, 1979b:12). Of 637 new white-collar jobs established between 1966 and 1976 85% were located in Rarotonga (op cit:13) thus accentuating the already considerable bias of bureaucratic employment in Rarotonga, a trend which has continued in subsequent years.

The largest single source of employment is the Cook Islands government; although government employment is largely concentrated in Rarotonga a very high proportion of those earning wages and salaries in the outer islands are government employees. For example, on Pukapuka and Nassau, all employment is with the government or in a 'private business', such as a small store where wages are not paid (Hecht, 1978). In 1981 the Cook Islands government employed 2,154 workers, some 39% of all employed workers. Of these 1,916 were employed with the Cook Islands Public Service and 238 with statutory bodies (Cook Islands Census, CPD9-82). However employment in the 'community, social and personal services' sector levelled off in the late 1970s, and fell overall between 1971 and 1981, partly because of government measures to decrease the size of the public service, and partly because as the primary and secondary sectors of the economy have declined in size and require less support services than previously (Hayes, 1983). Nevertheless the level of government employment, and hence public service wages, is critical to the operation of the national economy.

Between 1976 and 1981 the number of people employing labour increased from only 56 to 148; most of these were in the transportation, sales and services areas suggesting that 'a small class of entrepreneurs' has developed, primarily in association with commercial tourism, since hoteliers and restaurateurs are prominent (Hayes, 1983). In the same period there was also an increase in the number of 'working managers' in sales occupations, which probably reflected the large increase in the number of village grocery stores on Rarotonga in recent years as a result of increasing food imports and the monetisation of the local food sector (Hayes, 1983). In other sectors of the workforce changes were less marked.

Table 2. Distribution of the actively engaged population by Sector, 1966-81.

Sector	1966		1971		1976		1981	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculture & Fishing	2,146	37.1	1,421	22.7	1,175	21.8	1,697	29.2
"Primary" Sector	2,146	37.1	1,421	22.7	1,175	21.8	1,697	29.2
Manufacturing	602	10.4	555	8.9	514	9.5	397	6.8
Construction & Quarrying	291	5.0	766	12.2	292	5.4	325	5.6
"Secondary" Sector	893	15.4	1,321	21.1	806	15.0	722	12.4
Electricity & Water	60	1.0	76	1.2	81	1.5	137	2.4
Transport & Communications	472	8.2	566	9.0	437	8.1	581	10.0
Wholesale & Retail Trade	416	7.2	468	7.5	495	9.2	717	12.3
Community, Social & Personal Services (a)	1,276	22.1	2,031	32.4	1,804	33.5	1,704	29.3
"Tertiary" Sector	2,224	38.5	3,141	50.1	2,817	52.3	3,149	54.0
Not Classifiable by Sector (b)	520	9.0	386	6.1	586	10.9	252	4.4
TOTAL	5,783	100.0	6,269	100.0	5,384	100.0	5,810	100.0

(a) Includes finance, business and insurance services.

(b) Includes "new workers" awaiting first employment, unemployed, or persons without a normal occupation or industry.

Source: Hayes, 1983.

The regional distribution of the labour force has changed little since 1966; the concentration of the labour force in Rarotonga (60%) is greater than the concentration of the total population (54%), which is consistent with Rarotonga's role in the national economy. Regional variations in economic activity (Tables Three and Four) show how less than 20% of primary sector employment occurs in Rarotonga, whereas 83% of secondary and 76% of tertiary employment is there. Only 14% of Rarotonga's economically active male population is engaged in agriculture and fishing compared with 57% in the southern group and 75% in the northern group. Among females the contrast is even greater; less than 1% of Rarotonga females are engaged in agriculture and fishing compared with 82% of economically active northern group women (Hayes, 1983). Whilst this understates the actual labour input of women into agriculture in Rarotonga it is representative of very great economic differences between the regions of the country. Although the very small southern islands such as Mitiaro (Table Four) have an employment structure which is much like those of the northern atolls in its lack of diversification, the higher proportion of community, social and personal services in the southern group tends to differentiate the two groups.

The first detailed survey of employment and wages in the Southern Group of the Cook Islands was carried out in March 1979; it is indicative of the structure of formal employment on the outer islands that some data (including that on wages and salaries) were published in aggregated form since it would otherwise have disclosed the returns of individual establishments. In the southern group of islands (Rarotonga, Aitutaki, Mangaia, Atiu, Mauke and Mitiaro) there were a total of 414 establishments (of which 285 were on Rarotonga) and 3,553 employees (of whom 2,943 were on Rarotonga). The vast majority of wage and salary employment is in service activities of different kinds; only 6% of paid workers were in agriculture and fishing and 12% in manufacturing. Agriculture and fishing was the only activity in which less than two-thirds of all employment was on Rarotonga (Table Five) but in most other activities almost all employment was there. Very little paid employment exists on islands other than Rarotonga and Aitutaki. When employment is differentiated according to government and non-government structure (Table Six), it is apparent that almost all employment on the smaller islands is in government activities of various kinds (although Aitutaki also has an unusually high proportion of employment in the public sector). On Mauke and Mitiaro, whose employment structure resembles that of the northern group, none of the private sector workers are full-time. The employment (and income) structures of Palmerston (Crocombe, 1974:220) and Pukapuka (Hecht, 1978) have been discussed briefly elsewhere. Not all non-private sector employment is with the government, especially in Rarotonga, where 48% of all employment in 1979 was in the public service and 41% in the private sector, but the remaining 11% was in a range of administrative bodies and projects, including the churches, of which the two largest Cook Islands activities were the Philatelic Bureau and the Waterfront Commission, each with 25 full-time workers, whilst the New Zealand Ministry of Transport employed 111 workers. Of the 1,414 employees in the government much the largest group were employed in education (315), and most of these were full-time, followed by public works (213) and health (198), although the latter had more full-time workers (Cook Islands Statistical Abstract 9/1979).

Table 3. Regional distribution of the labour force by economic sector, 1981.

Sector	Rarotonga		Southern		Northern		Cook Islands	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculture & Fishing	328	19.3	727	42.8	628	37.0	1,697	100.0
"Primary" Sector	328	19.3	727	42.8	628	37.0	1,697	100.0
Manufacturing	351	88.4	37	9.3	7	1.8	397	100.0
Construction & Quarrying	247	76.0	64	19.7	11	3.4	325	100.0
"Secondary" Sector	598	82.8	101	14.0	18	2.5	722	100.0
Electricity & Water	101	73.7	36	26.3	-	-	137	100.0
Transport & Communications	458	78.8	89	15.3	24	4.1	581	100.0
Wholesale & Retail Trade	604	84.2	91	12.7	22	3.1	717	100.0
Community, Social & Personal Services	1,217	71.4	379	22.2	94	5.7	1,704	100.0
"Tertiary" Sector	2,380	75.8	595	19.0	140	4.5	3,139	100.0
Not Classifiable by Occupation	181	71.8	71	28.2	-	-	252	100.0
TOTAL	3,487	60.0	1,494	25.7	786	13.5	5,810	100.0

Source: Hayes, 1983.

Table 4. Economically Active Population by Industry Major Division and Island, 1981.

Industry Major Division	Cook Islands	Island							Penrhyn Sea					
		Rarotonga	Aitutaki	Mangaia	Atiu	Mauke	Mitiaro	Palmerston		Nassau	Pukapuka	Manihiki	Rakahanga	
TOTAL	5,810	3,487	644	344	285	153	68	13	65	339	134	77	158	43
Agriculture & Fishing	1,697	328	271	186	164	75	31	9	62	299	91	58	109	14
Quarrying	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manufacturing	397	351	12	8	15	1	1	-	-	-	7	-	-	2
Electricity & Water	137	101	16	5	8	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction	309	231	35	21	2	4	2	-	-	3	4	-	4	3
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Restaurants & Hotels	717	604	58	19	10	4	-	-	-	8	6	2	6	-
Transport & Communication	581	458	63	12	7	4	3	1	-	5	5	2	11	10
Finance, Insurance & Business Services	131	119	8	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Community, Social & Personal Services	1,573	1,098	149	78	70	48	23	3	3	24	21	15	28	13
Activities not elsewhere classified	252	181	32	15	6	10	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Seven (7) people who were on Manuae have been included in the Aitutaki data.

Source: Cook Islands Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, December 1982:iv.

Table 5. Wage and Salary Employment, Southern Group, 1979.

	Total													
	Southern Group		Rarotonga		Aitutaki		Mangai		Atiu		Mauike		Mitiaro	
	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time	Full time	Part-time
Agriculture and Fishing	206	15	85	3	35	5	32	-	8	-	15	-	1	7
Quarrying	11	8	10	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manufacturing	411	29	393	17	16	-	1	1	1	4	-	7	-	-
Electricity & Water Supply	92	-	62	-	17	-	-	-	5	-	8	-	-	-
Construction	270	-	229	-	31	-	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Restaurants & Hotels,	620	65	581	53	30	6	5	-	4	4	-	2	-	-
Transport & Communication	444	101	417	98	14	1	3	-	3	-	4	1	3	1
Finance, Insurance & Business	49	3	49	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community, Social and Personal Services	1,450	96	1,117	62	139	8	68	1	68	96	1,117	62	139	8
TOTAL	3,553	317	2,943	236	283	28	119	2	3,553	317	2,943	236	283	28
Agriculture and Fishing	8	-	15	-	1	7	-	-	8	-	15	-	1	7
Quarrying	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manufacturing	1	4	-	7	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	7	-	-
Electricity & Water Supply	5	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	8	-	-	-
Construction	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Restaurants & Hotels	4	4	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	2	-	-
Transport & Communication	3	-	4	1	3	1	-	-	3	-	4	1	3	1
Finance, Insurance & Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community, Social and Personal Services	68	4	44	3	14	18	-	-	68	4	44	3	14	18
TOTAL	119	12	71	13	18	26	-	-	119	12	71	13	18	26

Source: Cook Islands Statistics Office, Survey of Employment and Wages, 1979:11-16.

Table 6. Cook Islands: Employed Population by Employer Sector and Island, 1981.

Employer Sector	Cook Islands	Rarotonga	Southern Group Excluding Rarotonga					Northern Group	Palmerston	Nassau	Pukapuka	Manihiki	Rakahanga	Penrhyn	At Sea	
			Mangaia	Atiu	Mauke	Mitiaro	Northern Group									
TOTAL	5,541	3,299	1,414	612	320	279	143	60	786	13	65	339	134	77	158	42
NON PRIVATE	2,429	1,617	646	317	126	101	70	32	149	4	5	38	31	20	51	17
Local Government	2,154	1,416	593	281	120	97	65	30	130	3	5	36	28	16	42	15
Public Service*	1,916	1,235	536	224	120	97	65	30	130	3	5	36	28	16	42	15
Ad-Hoc Bodies	238	181	57	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand Government	185	149	26	23	1	1	1	-	9	1	-	1	-	1	6	1
Religious Organisations	90	52	27	13	5	3	4	2	10	-	-	1	3	3	3	1
PRIVATE	3,106	1,677	767	295	193	178	73	28	637	9	60	301	103	57	107	25
Private Enterprises**	1,662	1,426	183	118	22	34	8	1	38	-	-	8	22	2	6	15
Other Private	1,444	251	584	177	171	144	65	27	599	9	60	293	81	55	101	10
Self-employed and producing for own or family's consumption	867	147	400	49	133	127	65	26	311	-	28	282	-	1	-	9
Self-employed and producing for other than own or family's consumption	577	104	184	128	38	17	-	1	288	9	32	11	81	54	101	1
NOT STATED	6	5	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\* Includes employees of the New Zealand Government who have been seconded to the Cook Islands Government and also includes employees of the Island Councils.

\*\* Includes all registered businesses.

Note: Seven (7) people who were on Manuae have been included in the Aitutaki Data.

Source: Cook Islands Census, CPD9-82:10.

Table 7. Rarotonga. Wage and Salary Employment, 1979-1981.

	Total Employees		Private Sector		Non-private Sector	
	1979	1982	1979	1982	1979	1982
Agriculture and Fishing	88	70	-	-	88	70
Mining and Quarrying	10	18	-	-	10	18
Manufacturing	410	332	312	275	98	57
Electricity & Water Suppl	62	94	-	-	62	94
Construction	229	193	122	89	107	104
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Restaurants, Hotels	634	531	561	493	73	48
Transport & Communication	515	490	178	213	337	277
Finance, Insurance and Business	52	100	45	64	7	36
Community, Social and Personal Services	1,179	1,199	107	173	1,072	1,026
TOTAL	3,179	3,027	1,325	1,297	1,854	1,730

Source: Cook Islands Statistical Abstract 2/1983, Rarotonga.

Employment trends in Rarotonga have been monitored in the succeeding years, not only through the census, but also through further surveys (Table Seven). This indicates a significant and disturbing trend in the employment structure of Rarotonga, and all the evidence suggests that this trend is not untypical of other Cook Islands, although on a vastly reduced scale. Over a three-year period there was an overall 6% decline in formal sector employment on the island (a loss of 152 jobs) although between 1981 and 1982 there was an increase. However, this loss was not evenly distributed falling most dramatically in three sectors: agriculture and fishing, manufacturing and construction. The first two of these (alongside construction) are the only productive sectors in the country; in 1979 they accounted for 18% of all employment but by 1981 this had fallen to 12%, a significant and substantial decline and continuing the decline between 1966 and 1976. This overall decline was partly offset by small increases in the finance, electricity and water supply and service sectors, illustrating the considerable increase in the role of government employment. At the end of the 1960s the emergence of the tertiary sector, even if concentrated in Rarotonga, could be regarded as 'progress associated with the broadening of the base of the economy of the Cook Islands' (Cook, 1969:38) a situation which has now evolved to the extent that broadening the base back towards primary production would now be most useful. Approximately 43% of the workforce is employed in the private sector and despite efforts to develop this sector there seems little prospect of this proportion diminishing. A staff freeze on the Public Service was imposed in 1981 in an attempt to reduce further expansion of the government sector and this freeze was the cause of a slight increase in the proportion of private sector employment between 1981 and 1982.

As elsewhere in the South Pacific there are no good indications of the unemployment level in the Cook Islands. The 1966 and 1976 Censuses recorded information on the number of people who were 'unemployed'; in 1976 this total was 168 (3.3% of the workforce) whereas in 1966 it had been 403 (7% of the workforce) and, of the 1976 unemployed, 60% were in Rarotonga. This decline in unemployment has been accompanied by an increase in the number of

unpaid family workers, a category which increased from 163 to 390; this suggests some change in the manner of formulating questions and recording responses over the decade. However between 1976 and 1981 the numbers of unemployed again increased (Table One) suggesting that some of those who were previously satisfied to be family workers were seeking formal employment in 1981 (Hayes, 1983). Of the 269 who were unemployed and seeking work in 1981 some 188 were in Rarotonga, 32 were on Aitutaki and all the others were elsewhere in the southern group (Cook Islands Census, CPD9-82:1). However, questions on unemployment

'cannot be answered from census data which are intended to give only a general picture. A more detailed analysis based on household surveys would be required before a judgement could be made on the number of genuinely unemployed in the country. Certainly it is paradoxical to suggest a large number of under-employed given the extreme dependency ratios of most islands' (Hayes, 1979b:17).

The fact that unemployment is greater in Rarotonga (which had two-thirds of the unemployed in 1976 and slightly more in 1981), whilst unpaid family workers were distributed according to the overall population distribution (at least between Rarotonga and the outer islands), suggests that there is some degree of formal unemployment, principally in Rarotonga. However, early estimates of unemployment such as that of at least 300 unemployed men on Rarotonga in 1971 (Blamires, 1971:44) a total, which if true, must have been further inflated after the completion of the airport, are not now made at these levels. Emigration has certainly reduced the level of unemployment. However, the fact that formal employment is decreasing whilst the labour force is becoming more youthful (51% of that in Rarotonga in 1976 was under 30), which blocks opportunities for new entries to the workforce, severely limits the employment opportunities of school leavers, who have increasingly tended to resort to emigration. This has been of growing concern to the extent that the Manpower Training Unit began in 1982 a programme investigating the employment and migration of school leavers. There is, however, a labour shortage in the Cook Islands especially of skilled workers and tradesmen (cf. Haas, 1977:43), a shortage which in part has resulted from high out-migration, and has resulted in in-migration of expatriates (see below). The lack of local training facilities in either agricultural or industrial skills, long recognised as a problem in the Cook Islands (Davis, 1975:75), was expected to be reduced when a training institute was proposed in 1977; it was never started and the problem of developing and retaining skills in a small economy remain, especially as those skills are increasingly specialised. The existing Plan summary places some emphasis on this issue. Many of those who obtain marketable skills in the Cook Islands subsequently emigrate (Hayes, 1982:271) whilst others sent to learn specific skills in New Zealand are unlikely to return (op cit:272). There is also a shortage of labour for many agricultural activities (see below).

Some information is available on wages, salaries and incomes in the Cook Islands. In 1979 the average hourly wage rate for Rarotonga was \$1.07 and for the other islands in the southern group was \$0.79. By 1982 the average hourly wage rate in Rarotonga was \$1.51. Average annual salaries followed the same pattern with average annual salaries for Cook Islands Maori and other permanent residents of Rarotonga \$3,723 compared with \$3,288 for the other islands. By 1982 the average annual salary in Rarotonga was \$5,121. Comparable data was not available for other islands and, in general, published data is not available on wages and salaries by island but

it is probable that average wage and salary levels are roughly proportionate to the population size of the islands. There are few official data on the distribution of incomes in the Cook Islands although there are substantial disparities in income levels between Cook Islanders and expatriates; the latter, who comprised 6% of tax payers in 1975, accounted for 30% of the total personal income tax collected. Inter-personal income differentials are probably small. Incomes vary considerably between the islands of the southern group and, more generally, between the larger islands of the south and the atolls of the north, where cash incomes are very low. A 'ballpark estimate' of per capita income in Pukapuka in 1974, with some assumptions about remittances gave a figure of \$81 in households without salaried employees (Hecht, 1978:2). The returns from copra production are distributed equitably within the income so that the two sources of income inequality are salaries and remittances.

Efforts to develop employment opportunities on the outer islands have involved the important, and unusual within the South Pacific, concept of job-sharing. On outer islands part-time work is distributed to those without full-time employment (Hecht, 1978) presumably on an equitable basis. More formally, on Mitiaro, where there are very few full-time occupations, job-sharing is practised in government departments. One group of workers perform the work for one week and then stand down so that another group can have paid employment during the next week. Whilst the numbers involved in such a scheme are small (and its value has not been evaluated) it is indicative of the possibilities for providing employment in small communities where subsistence agriculture retains its importance. The Cook Islands has also developed an innovative work-experience programme, in which secondary school leavers are released from school for one day per week to work in government departments, to develop both practical skills and interests. However, on the outer islands, even part-time post-school employment opportunities are limited and, despite an apparent increase in interest in employment, there are still inadequate jobs for school leavers (D. Hunter, pers. comm, 1981). Thus in the Cook Islands as a whole employment opportunities exist, primarily in the agricultural sector in the southern group (see below), alongside unemployment, especially of those with some degree of secondary education whose formal education level is inadequate for the few skilled employment opportunities of Rarotonga and considered inappropriate for agricultural employment.

### Population

The Cook Islands is one of the few countries in the world, and therefore in the South Pacific, where the population history is so recent that legends of the first migrations to the country remain. The Cook Islands were among the last parts of the South Pacific to be settled, Rarotonga itself being settled, probably from Raiatea in French Polynesia, little more than 1,100 years ago and some of the northern atolls as recently as the 13th Century (cf. Hayes, 1983). Various estimates have been made of the population of the islands at the time of European contact, enabling estimates of the total population in the early 19th Century ranging from 14,760 to 19,410 (Hayes, 1983) indicating that the pre-contact population was close to its present level.

The period from contact until well into the 20th Century was a critical one for the Cook Islands and for most of Polynesia, when the population fell dramatically as a result of warfare, disease and sterility, labour recruiting and general social disorganisation (Curson, 1973:103) factors

which affected the individual islands in different ways. Labour recruiters sought workers for plantation, diving and domestic work in Tahiti, for the sugar fields of Hawaii, the phosphate deposits of various islands (but especially on the Line Islands), for the plantations of Peru (Maude, 1981) and also for California. On some islands, such as Pukapuka, the population fell rapidly but on others, such as Manihiki, where the chiefs were able to prevent labour migration (Hayes, 1983), decline was less marked. However, from the mid-1840s 'in spite of the attempts by the chiefs of most southern islands to prevent emigration, large numbers of young men left for Tahiti or the 'guano' islands on temporary labour contracts or sought adventure in Sydney, Honolulu or California' (Hayes, 1983). Between 1830 and 1900 the cumulative effect of these influences had resulted in a dramatic population decline, nowhere more so than on Rarotonga and Penrhyn, both of which, by the end of the century, had lost between 70 and 80% of their original population, and the population of the Cook Islands as a whole decreased by half during the last three-quarters of the 19th Century (Hayes, 1983; cf. McArthur, 1967). The enthusiasm with which young men enlisted for contract labour was remarkable (cf. Curson, 1973: 107) and the age and sex-selectivity of migration, except perhaps on Manihiki (McArthur, 1967:187), contributed to the population decline. Thus the great traditions of Polynesian migration were being replicated in the 19th Century, often over much longer distances (to America and Australia) and were a precursor, in all but sex-selectivity, direction and duration, of the equally dramatic out-migration of the second half of the 20th Century.

The establishment of missions, incipient ports and trade resulted in the first central places. Before contact the population had lived in dispersed hamlets but missionaries encouraged the concentration of population near churches (Hayes, 1983). On Rarotonga a movement of population to the Avarua district was evident as early as 1845 when a 'drift of restless young people' from the Takitumu district was noticed (Pittman, 1847, cited by Curson, 1973:107). By 1854 the Avarua district had some 31% of the island's population and by the last decade of the century this proportion had reached almost 45% (*ibid*). A limited 'urbanisation' was early established on Rarotonga.

Unsurprisingly there was also substantial population movement within the Cook Islands in the 19th Century, and especially to Rarotonga, many of whom contributed to the urbanisation of Avarua although then, as in more recent years, 'for many of these migrants, however, Rarotonga was simply a preliminary step in a chain of migration that would be completed elsewhere' (Curson, 1973:108). Whilst there was some movement of Europeans into the islands, and especially Rarotonga, the general movement was outwards such that 'by the turn of the new century the level of absentees had reached such proportions as to excite the concern of the local community and in 1900 efforts were made to limit the number of persons who could be enlisted for work outside the group' (Curson, 1973:108-109). However, the limits were unsuccessful since labour migrants 'were often encouraged by the island's New Zealand administration who in the best traditions of the Protestant ethic preferred to see individual industriousness and personal gain rather than Islanders held in bondage by the traditional chiefly system' (Curson, 1973:109). Thus in so many respects the 19th Century migration history of the Cook Islands was very similar to the migration history of the second half of the 20th Century.

In the 20th Century, and especially after the First World War, there was a decline in labour recruiting and emigration from Rarotonga, brought about by economic depression (and hence, amongst other things, falling

phosphate prices alongside the working out of many deposits and the decline of plantation economies), the disappearance of whaling and a decline in shipping services. However, development on Rarotonga contributed to migration there from other Cook Islands and may have reduced the incentives to out-migration. By 1915 the Resident Commissioner observed 'each year there is a tendency to increase wages on Rarotonga and this, together with the picture house and other amusements, attracts younger men from the other islands' (cited by Curson, 1973:109); the incentives to migration of economic and social inequalities had been noted early. Moreover migrants to Rarotonga came from other parts of the South Pacific, principally French Polynesia but also from Niue, Samoa, Rotuma, Papua New Guinea and elsewhere (op cit:110). Many of these migrants, especially those from the outer islands, were beginning to settle permanently on Rarotonga before the end of the first decade of the 20th Century.

By the end of the 19th Century there had been a census in Rarotonga (1895) and the first comprehensive census of all the islands was taken in 1906. This and all subsequent censuses corresponded with those of New Zealand (McArthur, 1967:191) hence the record of 20th Century population change is much more detailed than in most other South Pacific countries and is discussed in detail elsewhere (McArthur, 1967:197-230; Hayes 1982 and 1983). From a total of around 8,000 people in all the islands in 1902, the population had more than doubled by 1956 with the number increasing at each succeeding census, despite substantial labour migration to Makatea (see below) and some degree of emigration to New Zealand which by the mid-1950s had become a more important destination than Makatea.

A major long-term trend is that of the declining proportion of population in the northern group (Table Eight), as the economic and political balance of power has gradually shifted to Rarotonga. Sixty years ago the north had nearly one-quarter of the total population but in 1976 it had only 12.5%. However, in the latest intercensal period (1976-1981) the number of people living in the north increased from 1,989 in 1976 to 2,213 in 1981, the first reversal of a long-term decline, principally because of the 'return' of a travelling party to Manihiki and increasing population on Penrhyn (Table Nine).

The extent to which the slight upturn in the population of the northern group is an indication of a long-term trend remains to be seen. The earlier declining proportion of the population in the northern group was counterbalanced by an increasing proportion of population in the southern group and in Rarotonga. In the past decade, however, both have lost population and the decline in the southern group has been particularly marked, the population falling by 7% in the period 1976-81; this was most marked on Mangaia and Mitiaro, both of which lost more than 10% of their population in the Nine-year period (Table Nine). In the past decade therefore a major long-term trend has been altered; whereas, on the basis of the 1976 census results, it was concluded that 'these trends - major losses by the most remote and least naturally endowed islands, less dramatic losses by "outer" regions somewhat better advantaged, and growth in the main islands - have been previously noted in Tonga and Fiji' (Walsh, 1982:128) as well as in the Cook Islands. However the evidence of the past decade indicates that it is now in the 'inner ring' of outer islands that depopulation is most rapid.

Table 8. Population at Successive Censuses by Islands (1902-1976).

	1902	1906	1911	1916	1921	1926	1936	1945	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981
Rarotonga	2,060	2,441	2,759	3,064	3,503	3,936	5,054	5,573	6,048	7,212	8,676	9,971	11,478	9,802	9,530
Aitutaki	1,170	1,162	1,237	1,302	1,373	1,431	1,719	2,356	2,396	2,565	2,582	2,579	2,855	2,423	2,335
Mangaia	1,541	1,531	1,471	1,245	1,230	1,249	1,459	1,845	1,830	1,970	1,877	2,002	2,081	1,530	1,364
Atiu	918	918	812	759	837	933	1,086	1,114	1,270	1,307	1,266	1,327	1,455	1,312	1,225
Mauke	370	446	457	490	578	511	652	804	836	815	785	671	763	711	681
Mitiaro	165	210	199	237	207	238	265	229	305	275	307	293	331	305	256
Manuae	10	-	29	23	-	23	8	28	20	32	18	15	2	-	12
Palmerston	115	82	107	90	83	97	90	65	87	77	86	86	62	56	51
Pukapuka	505	435	490	474	530	526	651	662	559	638	718	684	732	785	796
Nassau	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	124	110	109	167	160	123	134
Suvarrow	30	-	-	7	-	-	-	5	-	58	1	-	1	1	-
Manihiki	484	521	444	493	432	416	487	435	816	661	1,006	584	452	266	405
Rakahanga	400	352	315	295	310	327	290	318	261	341	319	323	339	283	272
Penrhyn	445	420	335	326	376	395	467	654	527	619	628	545	612	531	608
TOTAL	8,213	8,518	8,655	8,805	9,459	10,082	12,246	14,088	15,079	16,680	18,378	19,247	21,323	18,128	17,754 (a)

(a) Includes 85 people 'at sea'.

Source: Cook Islands 1976 Census:55.

Table 9. Population Change - 1976-1981.

	1976	1981	% Change 1976-1981	Area (a) (sq.kms.)	Popu- lation Density (persons/ sq.km.) 1981
Northern Group	2,046	2,266	10.8	22.3	99
Southern Group	6,280	5,873	-6.5	146.0	41
Rarotonga	9,802	9,530	-2.8	67.1	142
Southern Aitutaki	2,423	2,335	-3.6	18.3	126
Mangaia	1,530	1,364	-10.8	51.8	26
Atiu	1,312	1,225	-6.6	26.9	46
Mauke	711	681	-4.2	18.4	37
Mitiaro	305	256	-16.1	22.3	11
Manuae	-	12	-	6.2	-
Northern Pukapuka	785	796	1.4	0.5	615
Nassau	123	134	8.9	2.1	64
Manihiki	266	405	52.2	5.4	75
Rakahanga	283	272	-3.9	4.1	66
Penrhyn	531	608	14.5	9.8	62
Suwarrow	1	-	-	0.4	-
Palmerston	56	51	-8.9	2.1	24
TOTAL	18,128	17,754(a)	-2.1	235.4	75

(a) Areas of particular Cook Islands may not be accurate. For example, in different sources, the area of Pukapuka is variously recorded as 0.45, 0.5, 1.24 and 5.17 sq. kms., a situation which gives population densities ranging from 1,768 to 154 person per sq. km. This report therefore accepts the figure given by Hayes (1983) of 615, but not without reservations.

(b) Includes 85 persons 'at sea'.

During the period 1966-1976 there was a steady decline in the proportion of the population aged under 15 years in Rarotonga and the southern group (although the proportion in the southern group was still high), but not in the northern islands where fertility levels are presumed to have remained high, and there was also an overall increase in the proportion of older people, aged 60 years and over (Walsh, 1982:129). The 1981 results for Nga-Pu-Toru (Atiu, Mauke and Mitiaro) indicate that the most significant change of all was in the decline of the 0-14 age group whilst there was also an increase in the proportion of the 60+ age group (Hunter, 1982:7). These trends were reported for the country as a whole, so that the 0-14 age group fell sharply from 49.8% of the population in 1976 to 42.7% in 1981; the population aged over 60 grew from 6.0% to 6.6%. Until 1976 out-migration had resulted in a considerable decline in the 15-59 age-groups, predominantly in the younger groups, giving the country a very high dependency rate. The 1981 data therefore demonstrate a substantial fall in that rate.

Age-sex pyramids from 1976 (Walsh, 1982:131) show a major distortion in the population structure of the southern and northern groups compared with a reasonably balanced structure in Rarotonga. Children and older people were heavily over-represented and working age adults under-represented in both regions. The decline in dependency rate between 1976 and 1981 gave both groups a population much like that of Rarotonga where, since in-migration largely balanced emigration, the population structure exhibited little overall change between 1966 and 1981. The period 1966-1976 showed no significant changes in the number of working age males in Rarotonga but the southern group lost 6.6% of its 1966 male population aged 15-29 years and 16.7% of males aged 30-44 years. In the northern group the comparable losses were 15.4% and 42.0% (Walsh, 1982:129). It remains true that Rarotonga has a much more balanced age and sex structure than any other part of the country, and especially than the northern group.

In recent years there has been some evidence of declining fertility and an overall decline in birth rates (Hayes, 1979a:5). For the Cook Islands as a whole there has been a steady decline in the Crude Birth Rate from a peak of 48.6 per thousand in 1961 to 26.4 in 1982, and the decline was continuing. The infant mortality rate in 1981 was 28.5 per thousand for the population as a whole but was about three points higher in the northern group, compared with the southern group, because of health care delivery problems. Over the same period the Crude Death Rate has fallen from 8.5 to 4.9 and the trend downwards was continuing even though this is one of the lowest, if not the lowest, rates in the South Pacific region. The Crude Natural Increase had also declined from 40.1 in 1961 to 20.5 in 1982; again this trend was continuous but in recent years only slowly. In the period 1971-76 the decline in fertility was most apparent in Rarotonga, where the population under 5 declined from 19.5% in 1971 to 14.1% in 1976 (Walsh, 1982:128) and further declined to 11.1% in 1976. For the nation as a whole the proportion under five was 12.5% in 1981 compared with 15.7% in 1976. This decline may have sown the seeds of a greater population decline in the future, and has already resulted in one of the lowest proportions in the age group 'four years and under' recorded anywhere in the South Pacific. Until 1976 this kind of decline was not evident in the northern Cook Islands, 'possibly due to cultural resistance to family planning' (Walsh, 1982:128) although there is little evidence of a significant degree of acceptance of family planning elsewhere within the Cook Islands. Indeed Graves and Graves conclude that relief from the high level of dependency 'cannot be found in reduced migration but in reduced fertility... A more vigorous programme of birth control would probably be helpful' (1976:40). Moreover Hayes argues 'paradoxically, emigration may encourage high fertility as parents are likely to have more children than they otherwise might in the hope that some will remain to maintain family land even if the majority emigrate' (1979a:8). The evidence from Nga-Pu-Toru, an area of high out-migration, and most other parts of the Cook Islands (but, to a lesser extent, in the northern group), is that, even if this does occur, it is no longer having a significant effect on the birth rate.

The dominant element in contemporary population change in the Cook Islands is that of migration, discussed in the following section. The rate of natural increase fell although its impact on population change was less than that of out-migration so that fertility is only the second determinant of population structure. The dependency rate has recently fallen significantly. Since migrants are above average fertility and productivity the long-term trends of this change are considerable (see below). Future population change in the Cook Islands is likely to continue to be absolutely dominated by migration. Out-migration has not been matched by substantial

Table 10. Present Residence and Birth Place.

Birth Place		Present Residence											Total	
		Rarotonga	Aitu-taki	Mangaia	Atiu	Mauke	Mitiaro	Palmerston	Pukapuka	Nassau	Manihiki	Rakahanga		Penrhyn
Rarotonga	M	2,975	137	67	79	32	20	3	32	6	16	20	19	3,406
	F	2,986	121	78	71	62	23	5	34	3	25	15	15	3,438
Aitutaki	M	253	911	5	8	2	-	-	4	-	3	2	3	1,191
	F	203	923	4	13	-	-	-	7	-	2	2	4	1,158
Mangaia	M	244	17	641	8	1	4	-	1	-	2	1	-	919
	F	194	24	622	9	7	3	1	3	-	1	-	-	864
Atiu	M	220	22	5	585	6	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	843
	F	188	11	4	491	15	5	1	2	-	2	1	2	722
Mauke	M	142	9	5	2	277	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	440
	F	123	5	6	6	257	1	-	4	-	1	2	-	405
Mitiaro	M	72	3	-	-	6	136	-	-	2	-	-	-	219
	F	92	1	-	7	10	108	-	-	1	-	1	-	220
Manuae	M	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
	F	5	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	9
Palmerston	M	22	-	1	-	-	-	21	-	-	2	1	6	53
	F	23	1	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	1	-	6	51
Pukapuka	M	54	5	3	-	-	-	-	317	41	-	1	2	423
	F	44	3	2	-	-	-	-	342	35	2	2	-	430
Nassau	M	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	15	19	-	1	-	38
	F	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	15	-	-	-	31
Manihiki	M	181	19	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	96	7	2	308
	F	154	11	2	5	3	1	-	-	1	93	6	11	287
Rakahanga	M	68	8	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	104	-	186
	F	71	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	111	3	192
Penrhyn	M	89	6	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	230	331
	F	89	8	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	203	304
At Sea	M	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3
	F	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C.I. Born	M	4,327	1,139	734	682	327	163	24	370	68	128	138	266	8,366
	F	4,176	1,115	722	602	354	141	28	404	55	130	140	244	8,111

Note: One person born in Suwarrow is shown as born in Rarotonga.

Source: Cook Islands Census 1976:104.

in-migration, other than by Europeans who, in 1976, constituted 3.5% of the total population compared with 92% Cook Islands Maori and 3% part Maori-European. In 1981 of the resident population 91% were Cook Islands Maoris, 4% were part Cook Islands Maori and 4.6% were of other ethnic origin.

### Internal Migration

The absence of recent census data relating directly to migration has limited the study of changing migration flows, since only life-time migration data are available. This is analysed here and subsequently compared with a number of academic studies, relating usually to particular islands or communities to evaluate the rationale for and impact of changing migration patterns. Analysis of internal life-time migration is possible from birth place data but since Cook Islands and New Zealand arrival and departure records do not indicate individual island of birth or residence, analysis of internal and external migration must be undertaken separately. The present unavailability of detailed 1981 census material has essentially limited this analysis to 1976 data; because of the growth of population on the northern islands since 1976 and the more rapid decline of the outer islands of the southern group, this limits the contemporary value of any analysis depending primarily on earlier data and socio-economic studies.

The lifetime migration situation in 1976 is recorded in detail in Table Ten, summarised in Table Eleven and depicted in graphic form elsewhere (Walsh, 1982:134-5) for all those born and remaining within the Cook Islands. A quarter of the population remaining in the Cook Islands were not resident on their island of birth in 1976. Out-migration rates (the ratio of out-migrants to population born on the island) were particularly high for Mitiaro and Mauke in the southern group and all islands except Pukapuka in the northern group, and for the southern group would be even higher for 1981. These islands had all lost over one-third of the population born there, and Palmerston, Nassau and, above all, Manihiki had lost over half the population born there. Immigration was especially significant to Rarotonga, which accounted for 64% of all such moves (compared with only 11% of out-migration) and Nassau. (The position of Nassau is a little anomalous in that it is an island used by Pukapuka people for copra production, and settled from there, so that most gains and losses from Nassau were with Pukapuka. Nassau was only settled after 1951 (Vayda, 1958) and is the only island with less than half its internal out-migrants on Rarotonga). With the exception of Pukapuka and Palmerston, from which only 51% and 71% respectively of migrants were resident in Rarotonga, more than four out of five migrants from all other islands were resident in Rarotonga in 1976. A small but significant movement occurred to Aitutaki from all islands except Nassau which tended to counter out-migration and depress the island's net migration rate. Walsh suggests both that movement between all islands except Rarotonga, Nassau and Aitutaki (and the last two were of limited significance) was mainly of a social, and not an economic nature, and that out-migration from Rarotonga was similarly motivated (Walsh, 1982:132). Much of this movement may be accounted for by return migration which can otherwise not be identified from the census data. Because of traditional land tenure restrictions and the few development projects outside Rarotonga, 'apart from people associated with the administration there simply is no reason to migrate to other islands for other than social purposes' (op cit:132); moreover many of the administration posts on particular islands are held by individuals from those islands. This explains both the

dominance of Rarotonga in all migration moves and also the localised nature of other migration moves, and especially the very limited movement between the northern and southern group.

Table 11. Inter-island and inter-regional Migration, 1976.

	Resident	Born	(Lifetime migrants, all ages).		In	Net
			Born and Resident	Out		
Rarotonga	8,504	6,844	5,961	883	2,543	1,660
Aitutaki	2,254	2,349	1,834	515	420	-95
Mangaia	1,456	1,783	1,263	520	193	-327
Atiu	1,284	1,565	1,076	489	208	-281
Mauke	681	845	534	311	147	-164
Mitiaro	304	439	244	195	60	-135
Manuae	-	15	-	15	-	-15
Palmerston	52	104	41	63	11	-52
Southern	6,031	7,100	4,992	2,108	1,039	-1,069
Pukapuka	774	853	659	194	85	-109
Nassau	123	69	34	35	89	54
Manihiki	258	595	189	406	69	-337
Rakahanga	276	378	215	163	61	-102
Penrhyn	512	635	433	202	79	-123
-	At sea 3	-	-	-	-	-
Northern	1,943	2,533	1,530	1,000	383	-617
COOK ISLANDS	16,478	16,477	12,483	-	-	-

(This table is derived from Table 5.01 of the 1976 Census - see also Table 7. There is a discrepancy of 3 individuals in the resident population figure which recalculation does not remove).

Source: Walsh, 1982:133.

The only information available on the characteristics of lifetime internal migrants was that of sex. Excluding Manuae, only two islands, Mitiaro and significantly Rarotonga, have an excess of female out-migration, thus out-migration is characterised by its male bias (Table Twelve).

Despite the excess of males in the lifetime migration movements only five islands have an excess of male in-migration, Rarotonga, Aitutaki, Pukapuka, Nassau and Rakahanga; this suggests that both Rarotonga and, to a lesser extent, Aitutaki function as employment centres and attract a greater proportion of male migrants whereas within the northern group there are no significant employment opportunities and both males and females move for social reasons within that group. Movement from the northern group to the southern group as a whole has a high male:female ratio (121) reflecting the much greater predominance of males in long distance migration moves.

The 1971 census collected data on place of residence in both 1970 and 1966, alongside data on sex and birthplace, but the tabulations derived from these data have never been published. Thus internal migration for two time

periods is available and part of this is summarised in Tables Thirteen and Fourteen. This demonstrates the considerable similarity between migration in the 1966-1971 period and lifetime migration (Table Ten). Thus the significance of Rarotonga as the principal migrant destination is readily apparent whilst all islands (with the exception of the Nassau and Pukapuka 'twins') received many more migrants from Rarotonga than from anywhere else in the Cook Islands. Several islands, such as Aitutaki, Mangaia, Atiu and Mauke, actually received more migrants from overseas than from any part of the Cook Islands other than Rarotonga. Examining migration from Rarotonga to other islands between 1966 and 1971 (Table Fourteen) it is apparent that a very high proportion (73%) of this migration is return migration, but that the proportion of return migrants is much less in the northern group; this may indicate the reduced ability of the northern group to attract back those who have once departed. (Inspection of the data on internal migration from islands other than Rarotonga suggests that much the same degree of return migration also exists for these migration streams, but the numbers are extremely small). Since these data refer to a period when external migration was limited, one that is quite different from the present situation, it is not analysed in greater detail here.

Table 12. Lifetime Migration.

	Males		Females	
	Out	In	Out	In
Rarotonga	431	1,353	454	1,190
Aitutaki	280	228	235	192
Mangaia	278	93	242	100
Atiu	258	97	231	111
Mauke	163	50	148	97
Mitiaro	83	27	102	33
Manuae	6	0	9	0
Palmerston	32	3	31	8
Pukapuka	106	63	88	62
Nassau	19	49	16	40
Manihiki	214	32	194	37
Rakahanga	82	33	81	28
Penrhyn	101	37	101	42

Source: Cook Islands Census, 1976:104.

The absence of contemporary information on non-lifetime migration in the Cook Islands, and also the regional variations in external migration, are major constraints to the analysis of migration. Estimations of migration in the period between 1966 and 1976 indicate that in the period 1966-1971 the majority (73%) of emigrants were from the outer islands, partly attributable to the low level of male out-migration from Rarotonga (since this time period coincided with both the expansion of the public service and airport construction). Between 1971 and 1976 both the northern and southern group contributed to out-migration in the same proportion as their representation in the total population (Hayes, 1983). However, in the decade 1966-1976, the highest migration rates were from the northern atolls, Manihiki, Rakahanga (and also Palmerston) but, as the 1981 population census demonstrates, these have been slowed; in the southern group Mangaia had the highest rate, a rate apparently maintained until 1981. Of all the islands Pukapuka had the lowest emigration rate between 1966 and 1976 and again this trend was maintained to 1981.

Table 13. Internal Migration, 1966-1971 (Population 5+).

Place of Usual Residence 1966	Place of Usual Residence, 1971.												
	Rarotonga	Aitutaki	Mangaia	Atiu	Mauke	Mitiaro	Manuae	Palmerston	Nassau	Manihiki	Rakahanga	Penrhyn	
Rarotonga	7,119	131	65	92	33	34	2	-	33	10	51	45	51
Aitutaki	238	2,043	8	11	7	1	-	-	11	1	12	4	11
Mangaia	206	6	1,565	9	1	-	-	-	5	-	2	-	-
Atiu	212	21	3	984	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-
Mauke	79	3	7	8	530	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-
Mitiaro	56	-	1	5	1	220	-	-	-	-	-	1	5
Manuae	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Palmerston	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	-	2	-	-	3
Pukapuka	80	11	1	3	-	-	-	-	523	72	4	-	1
Nassau	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	45	-	-	-
Manihiki	191	1	5	-	8	-	-	-	1	-	278	8	-
Rakahanga	46	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	200	1
Penrhyn	109	-	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	7	3	4	389
At Sea	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
New Zealand	730	87	45	17	14	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	8
Other	169	11	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
N.S.	36	4	8	9	4	-	-	-	4	-	3	2	1
TOTAL	9,291	2,320	1,713	1,143	602	255	2	53	620	138	360	269	471

Source: Cook Islands Census 1971 (unpublished tabulations).

Table 14. Internal Migration from Rarotonga, 1966-1971.  
(Population 5+)

	Island born	Rarotonga born	Born elsewhere including) New Zealand)
Aitutaki	169	53	7
Mangaia	132	16	16
Atiu	78	23	4
Mauke	76	12	5
Mitiaro	18	17	-
Manuae	2	-	-
Palmerston	4	-	-
Pukapuka	22	9	+6
Nassau	4	3	+6
Manihiki	27	12	+6
Rakahanga	22	14	+3
Penrhyn	12	7	+4
TOTAL	566	+166	+57

Source: Cook Islands Census 1971 (unpublished tabulations).

Further analysis of population change within the Cook Islands is possible by considering changes by census district, of which there were 39 in 1971 and 42 in 1981. There is considerable variation in the direction and magnitude of changes by census district. For example, on Aitutaki, where there are four census districts, that of Amuri-Araunga increased by 77% between 1971 and 1981 whilst each of the other three declined, and on Mangaia, where there are six census districts, one (Te Makatea) gained by 65% whilst the other five all declined by at least 20% (Hayes, 1983). Without more detailed socio-economic data at the census district level it is impossible to assess the significance of these changes, although Turua has suggested (Letter to Hayes, August 1983) that these particular movements are probably minor versions of the tendency for there to be a population drift to main centres.

The general population trends that have followed migration are clear. The population of the outer islands has more or less stagnated since the mid 1950s; between 1966 and 1981 only Mauke, Penrhyn and Pukapuka gained population and then only slightly. By contrast Rarotonga's population grew steadily until 1971 as the inflow from the outer islands more than compensated for out-migration but with the emigration boom of the 1970s the population of Rarotonga also fell (Table Eight). Internal migration cannot be considered separately from emigration.

### Urbanisation

Although in the 19th Century there was migration within Rarotonga towards Avarua, a migration that might be considered as 'urbanisation' and was simultaneously occurring in other port-towns of the South Pacific, more recent developments in communications have given all parts of Rarotonga easy

access to Avarua and, in many respects, it is more appropriate to consider the whole of Rarotonga as urban. Indeed Rarotonga, rather than Avarua, is usually considered to be the capital of the Cook Islands and, whilst Curson notes that 'Avarua is not a truly urban settlement but a loose agglomeration of five traditional village settlements held together by colonial-administrative fiat' (1973b:23), it actually lacks any separate legal status. Hayes comments that 'the term "urban" is used here only in a relative sense. The census districts of Pue-Matavera, Tupapa-Maraerenga, Takuvaine-Parekura, Tutakimoa-Teotue, Avatiu-Ruatonga have a greater population density than the remainder of the island and it is here that commercial and industrial life is concentrated' (1979a:15). However, perhaps the factor that gives it greatest significance as an urban centre is that it includes the principal settlements of outer islanders, (such as Pue and Tutakimoa) who have minimal rights of access to land on Rarotonga and who therefore tend to be concentrated in 'urban', non-agricultural occupations. In 1966 almost three-quarters of all outer islanders and foreign-born were in the urban area of Rarotonga (Curson, 1972:56) rather than elsewhere on the island.

Table 15. 'Urban' and 'Rural' Rarotonga Population

	1951	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981
Avarua	2,552	4,012	5,154	5,520	4,533	3,664
Rural Rarotonga	3,496	4,664	4,817	5,958	5,269	5,866

Source: Walsh, 1981:137; Cook Islands Census, 1981.

The migrant characteristics of Avarua are particularly apparent between 1951 and 1966 (Table Fifteen) when the rate of population growth in Avarua was significantly greater than that of the rest of Rarotonga. Since 1966, however, urban growth has been less than that in the rest of the island, and in the period 1971-1976 it experienced negative growth (-3.9%) in excess of that experienced in the rest of the island (-2.4%), (Walsh, 1982:137). The same trend continued between 1971 and 1976. This has been referred to by Hayes as 'de-urbanization' and resulted primarily from the emigration of population from those parts of the urban area where the highest proportion of outer islanders, predominantly from the southern group, were living (Hayes, 1979a:11). However, since many workers commute to Avarua and a number of 'urban' activities (such as the high school, teachers college and most hotels) are in the 'rural' area Walsh suggests that this process would be better termed 'suburbanization' (1982:137). Between 1976 and 1981 the urban population again fell rapidly, nowhere more so than in Avatiu-Ruatonga division, where the population almost halved. Avarua's importance has therefore declined significantly since 1966 when it comprised 52% of the island's population and almost 27% of the national population; in 1981 the respective proportions were 38% and 21% (Hayes, 1983). However, there is no real evidence of any significant decentralisation of population from Avarua and, for most purposes, it is probably appropriate to consider Avarua as being the administrative centre of the Cook Islands but the whole of Rarotonga as the urban area and capital.

The greater retention of the 'rural' population of Rarotonga, rather than the 'urban' population, between 1971 and 1976 is explained by the more rapid rate of emigration of southern outer island migrants who had previously moved to Avarua (Hayes, 1979a:11). This suggests, firstly, that

migration from the southern outer islands has increasingly been direct, rather than as 'step migration' through Rarotonga, and, secondly, that the level of emigration was lower in rural Rarotonga where economic opportunities (including employment in Avarua) were greater than for migrants in Avarua.

On the fringes of Avarua migrants from the northern group have formed what may be regarded as small-scale shantytowns on land leased from local landlords. For example, Pue on the eastern fringe of Avarua consists primarily of migrants from Pukapuka and Tutakimoa consists mainly of islanders from Manihiki, Rakahanga, Penrhyn and Palmerston. The migrants have constructed their own houses, at standards inferior to those elsewhere in Rarotonga, household sizes are large, health problems are considerable and 'for many of these people life is often marginal and extremely insecure, not only because of the land problem and low incomes, but also because of the fact that families are constantly having to house and feed relatives who arrive from the north' (Curson, 1968:43-44; cf. Curson, 1972:56-57; Beckett, 1964:428). Housing problems in Avarua were recognised as early as 1955 and loans have been granted for housing development (Curson, 1968:44) yet the necessity for outer-islanders to lease land means that outer-islanders are still 'squatters' in Rarotonga often in sub-standard houses (Tangatatutai, 1982; cf. Hayes, 1982a:205). Since many emigrants are 'in transit' from the outer islands through Rarotonga the implications of lack of security of land tenure, inadequate housing and services are apparent. The minimal extent of urbanisation in the Cook Islands has precluded the growth of the kinds of socio-economic problems that exist in larger urban centres. Whilst there are areas of inadequate sanitation and housing the marked increase in venereal disease and crime of the late 1960s (Curson, 1972:64) has not worsened significantly in the past decade. However newspaper reports in 1982 drew attention to apparently increasing problems of gangs, juvenile delinquency and petty crime, which was attributed to disrupted social organisation in the urban area, especially following the emigration of parents.

### International Migration

Throughout contemporary history the Cook Islands has been characterised by migration, principally external migration (initially labour migration and more recently more permanent out-migration) but also internal migration within the islands. In pre-historic times there was migration between the islands and Rakahanga and Manihiki were occupied by one population which journeyed from atoll to atoll as food supplies dictated (Hayes, 1983). Labour migration brought movement over much longer distances, including America (both North and South) and contemporary out-migration has amplified this trend, but in Australasia, as short-term labour circulation has given way to long-term out-migration. Only in the decades before the Second World War was there no significant labour migration from the Cook Islands. Hayes (1983) distinguishes five broad phases of migration in the Cook Islands history - the pre-European period until the 1820s, the 'missionary period' (1821-1888), the early colonial period (1888-1942), the late colonial 'Makatea' period (1942-1955) and the final period of mass migration to New Zealand (1956- ). The definition of these periods is indicative of changing influences in colonial history and the changing significance of links between Cook the Islands and the wider South Pacific region.

Traditional ties historically have always resulted in migration to French Polynesia, and this was emphasized by movement to the phosphate workings at Makatea, between 1942 and 1955 (cf. Crocombe, 1946; Curson,

1973c; Hayes, 1983). These labour contracts were highly sought after and on Mangaia at least there was a quota system for each village (Allen, 1969:80). 'Leakage' from the Makatea workings has resulted in an identifiable Cook Islands population in Tahiti; in 1969 it was estimated that there were around three to four hundred Cook islanders in Tahiti, most of them around Papeete (Cook, 1969:14). Since the 1960s most out-migration has been directed towards New Zealand and as the number of first-generation migrants declines there, and their children are absorbed into Tahitian society, the distinctiveness of the Cook Island population there has declined. But ties are maintained; there is an Atiu community there (Bollard, 1979:8) and tere parties (travelling groups of Cook Islanders) regularly visit French Polynesia.

Before the 1950s there was relatively little migration to New Zealand; there was limited knowledge of employment and other conditions in New Zealand and, other than shipping, there was only a fortnightly flight which was very expensive. Nevertheless the 1961 New Zealand census recorded 3,051 Cook Island Maoris and 1,448 part Cook Island Maoris there (not all of whom were migrants) although in the period 1 April 1945 to 31 March 1966 there was a net inflow of 5,796 Cook Island Maoris to New Zealand (Cook, 1969:16). McArthur estimated that between the 1951 and 1956 censuses there was a net loss of 439 (1967:204) but Cook estimates that this was 1,334 (op cit:17) indicating quite substantial annual losses even in the 1950s. In 1957 and 1958 the level of departures fell but many of the migrants in those years, now almost all migrating to New Zealand, were ex-Makatea workers whose period of indenture had served both as a stimulus to migration and a means of paying the fare (Curson, 1973c:17). The end of the 1950s saw an increase in migration to New Zealand as transport improved and the Cook Islands community in New Zealand grew. Between 1959 and 1965 the country experienced a net loss of 3,200 people, almost all to New Zealand, so that in the period from 1940 to 1971 there was a net emigration loss of more than 7,000 (op cit:18). By the mid 1960s almost all migration was to New Zealand and, by this time, migration to New Zealand had become more important than to Rarotonga. Thus in 1966 of 145 out-migrants from Mangaia 86 were in New Zealand, 44 in Rarotonga, 15 on other Cook Islands (Allen, 1969:78) and none in French Polynesia. This kind of pattern is true of other islands (cf. Hecht, 1978). Unrestricted movement between New Zealand and Australia for nationals of those countries has also given Cook Islanders (and Niueans and Tokelauans) unrestricted access to Australia, an opportunity that was increasingly sought in the 1970s; with one partial exception (Hambuechen, 1981) there has been no study of Cook Islanders in Australia and official statistics of Cook Islanders in Australia (see Country Report No.23) are massive under-enumerations. One estimate suggests as many as 4,000 to 5,000 Cook islanders in Australia (P.Macdonnell, pers. comm, 1981) but a quarter of that total may be a more realistic figure. This group are not subsequently discussed and distinguished here but their characteristics appear to be similar to those of migrants to New Zealand.

Contemporary migration to New Zealand has primarily consisted of young adults of working age with a predominance of males over females. Until the mid-1940s almost all migrants were males although, between 1940 and 1950, 47% of all migrants were women (Curson, 1973c:18). But from 1950 the predominance of males once again increased, especially between the ages of 20-34. Many of these stayed only short periods in New Zealand before returning to the Cook Islands. In the early and mid-1960s there was an increase in the numbers of women and young children emigrating as families moved to join husbands in New Zealand and, relatively belatedly, an increase in the number of older people (50+) moving to join existing nuclear families

in New Zealand and establish extended families. By then the 'chain-migration' system had become well-established and in 1965 nearly half of all migrants had their fares paid by a Cook Islander or family already in New Zealand (*op cit*,20). In the early 1970s there was again a resurgence in male migration, as overall migration increased significantly. followed later in the decade by other family members. In general therefore the availability of finance is a constraint to long-distance migration so that what might otherwise be seen as migration of a household is strung out over a period of years; since men tend to migrate first there is usually a male bias in migration streams which becomes a female bias when the overall migration rate is low. Thus in each year from 1977 to 1980 female net out-migration has slightly exceeded male net out-migration.

The overall migration balance in recent years (Table Sixteen) demonstrates a wide fluctuation in migration rates, in which the extremely large increase in emigration between 1972 and 1974 is apparent (a period which coincided with the completion of the airport). In the next half decade there was a relative decline in emigration but in the 1980s and, most recently, in 1982 the emigration rate has again increased towards the 1973-4 situation. However emigration in the first quarter of 1983 was the lowest for many years and, although this may be exceptional, it may also indicate a new decline in the emigration rate.

Table 16. Net migration and crude net migration rates for Maori and total population, 1966-82.

Year	Mid Year Population (a)		Net Migration		Rate/1000 Population	
	Total	Maori	Total	Maori	Total	Maori
1966	19,220	18,620	-253	-363	13.2	19.5
1967	19,570	18,930	-311	-334	15.9	17.6
1968	19,990	19,310	+16	-58	(+) 0.8	3.0
1969	20,400	19,680	-363	-530	17.8	26.9
1970	20,810	20,050	-212	-483	10.2	24.1
1971	21,230	20,420	-108	-237	5.1	11.6
1972	21,370	20,570	-999	-839	46.7	40.8
1973	20,790	19,990	-1,133	-1,311	54.5	65.6
1974	19,640	18,840	-1,872	-3,970	96.2	104.6
1975	18,370	17,570	-237	-308	12.9	17.5
1976	18,600	17,800	-507	-378	27.3	21.2
1977	18,620	17,820	+112	-200	(+) 6.0	11.2
1978	18,480	17,480	-639	-537	34.6	30.7
1979	18,200	17,300	-535	-523	29.4	30.2
1980	18,000	17,000	-1,025	-982	56.9	57.8
1981	17,500	16,900	-799	-472	45.7	27.9
1982	16,900	...	-802	-1,002	47.4	...

(a) Estimated.

Source: Hayes, 1983; Cook Islands Quarterly Statistical Bulletin March 1983.

The size of out-migration from the Cook Islands to New Zealand and the formation of households in New Zealand has resulted in the growth of a very large Cook Islands population in New Zealand (Table Seventeen) to the extent that in the early 1970's the number of Cook Island Maoris in New Zealand

exceeded that in the Cook Islands. This, however, includes Cook Island Maoris born in New Zealand (but excludes Cook Island Maoris in Australia and elsewhere) and takes no note of Cook Island Maoris born in New Zealand but living in the Cook Islands hence the number of Cook Island Maoris born in the Cook Islands and still living there remains greater than that outside the Cook Islands but the difference in numbers is declining. The large size of the emigrant population, relative to that remaining in the Cook Islands, has important implications both for continued emigration from the Cook Islands and the strength of links between New Zealand and the Cook Islands.

Table 17. Cook Islanders in New Zealand.

	Cook Islands Born	All Cook Islanders
1951	999	950
1956	1,992	2,320
1961	3,374	4,499
1966	5,838	6,330
1971	7,389	13,772
1976	11,567	18,610
1981	13,737	24,045

Source: Census of New Zealand, 1951-1981.

A separate report (Country Report No.23) discusses the economic and social context of Pacific Islanders, and therefore Cook Islanders, in New Zealand hence this is only summarised here. Most Cook Islanders in New Zealand are in Auckland, to a lesser extent Wellington and other smaller urban centres such as Tokoroa and Bluff. The Cook Islands population in New Zealand is relatively young but, in general, has a more balanced age structure than the population of the Cook Islands (Hayes, 1983). Historically Cook Islanders have been concentrated in the inner urban areas, where housing was cheap but since the 1960s there has been considerable suburbanisation, involving house purchases (a symbolic act of settlement), and a greater degree of apparent permanence of the migrant population, especially as numbers are greater than those in the Cook Islands. Historically most migrants have been concentrated in unskilled employment, often working with kin from the same village or island, and much of this remains where islanders work in wool stores, freezing works and factories. Rising educational levels have resulted in occupational mobility, especially for the young who have received most, if not all, of their education in New Zealand. Strong links are maintained through remittances and return visits. In all these characteristics Cook Islanders are no different from Samoans or Niueans in New Zealand. The prospects for return migration, involving a significant transfer of skills (and capital), to the Cook Islands appear extremely limited but an investigation of this is beyond the scope of the present study.

The situation in which there is very little emigration enables out-migration rates from particular islands to be regarded primarily as indicators of international migration and there are quite substantial variations in migration rate between islands. Since 1971 the principal islands of emigration have been Mangaia and to a lesser extent, Mitiaro, in the southern group, and in the northern group both Manihiki and Rakahanga have lost a significant proportion of their population (Tables Eight and Nine). Over a longer time period, from 1966, Manihiki and Mangaia are again

prominent as sources of migrants, this time in association with Palmerston. By contrast the atolls of the northern group have tended to retain their population more successfully than the islands of the southern group, with Pukapuka having gained population at every census since 1966.

International migration into the Cook Islands has historically resulted in the establishment of a small European population, which has had a disproportionate impact on the subsequent economic and political development of the country. In recent years the only international migration has been of short-term contract workers, and their families, principally from New Zealand, involved in development projects and filling positions in the public service, within the central administration and as teachers, or in other positions elsewhere in the country. In 1983 there were no fewer than 25 UN Volunteers, including qualified surgeons and engineers, in the Cook Islands. Most of the country's artisans, such as plumbers and mechanics, are expatriates (Haas, 1977:44). In 1976 those born outside the Cook Islands comprised 13% of the total Rarotonga population (a significant increase from the 8% of 1966) and a much smaller proportion of the population of other islands.

At the time of the 1976 census there were 382 contract workers (including spouses and children) in the country, 92% of whom were in Rarotonga; since their wages were usually significantly greater than those of indigenous workers they exerted a disproportionate social and economic influence on the Cook Islands (Hayes, 1979a:11,16) including such influences as imported inflation and the demonstration effect of relatively high living standards. These disparities are particularly great in the case of the growing number of expatriates associated with international agencies and aid projects. Thus the 'brain-drain' is compensated by the immigration of administrative and technical personnel at very high salaries, and involving other costs, such as imported inflation. Because of the existing wage and salary structure localisation is unsuccessful and the changing ethnic structure of the bureaucracy has contributed to a certain demoralisation of the remaining Cook Island Maori workers, who in some contexts may be regarded as an 'underclass' (P.Macdonnell, pers. comm, 1981) in their own country. To some extent the Cook Islands recruits labour within the region and has recruited workers from Fiji and Tonga and in 1975 was intending to recruit more from Fiji (Third South Pacific Labour Ministers Conference, 1975: 34-35) but, in practice, recruitment from the European countries has tended to prevail. There are no indications that there has been significant localisation, other than in some parts of the public service, within the past decade.

Since only 3.5% of the population were European (and 0.9% other races) this suggests some degree of 'return migration' to Rarotonga (the discrepancy in figures being accounted for by the number of children born overseas) but only very limited return migration to islands other than Rarotonga and Aitutaki, although the data are inadequate to test this. Since many children born overseas are likely to return with their parents this suggests a greater degree of return migration than is usually indicated in such estimates as that given to Trumbull, that 'only 1 per cent at most return to the islands' (1977:167), Graves and Graves' observation of 'the small stream of "returnees"' (1976:460) and the fact that few Cook Islanders working in Wellington were planning to return in the next two years (New Zealand Department of Labour, 1979:140). Although the difference between the numbers born in 'European' countries (mainly New Zealand) and Europeans (Table Eighteen) is very small the fact that this records lifetime migration, and does not account for Cook Islanders born in the Cook Islands

and returning there, indicates that there is significant return migration. This conclusion is further supported by data on immigration from 1966-1976 (Table Nineteen) which indicates the birthplace and 1971 place of residence of all those migrating to the Cook Islands between 1966 and 1971. Some 41% of all migrants into the Cook Islands had been born in the Cook Islands, mainly in the southern group, which leads further support to the suggestion (see above) that the northern group were only able to attract back a limited proportion of all out-migrants in the period 1966-1971. Of the 410 return migrants, some 274 were resident in Rarotonga (compared with the 180 born there); whilst there may be some degree of step return migration this does indicate the greater drawing power of Rarotonga for return migrants. The extent to which this situation reflects the contemporary situation is unknown hence these data are not analysed further here.

Table 18. Lifetime Migration, 1976.

	Birthplace New Zealand, Australia and UK	European
Rarotonga	1,025	563
Aitutaki	144	36
Mangaia	65	17
Atiu	27	6
Mauke	17	3
Mitiaro	-	-
Palmerston	4	-
Pukapuka	11	2
Nassau	-	-
Manihiki	4	4
Rakahanga	1	1
Penrhyn	15	0
TOTAL	1,313	632

No account is taken of 'Europeans' born elsewhere than the countries listed here and no account is taken of mixed-race population.

Source: Cook Islands Census 1976:105-106.

There is naturally considerable interest in the possibility of return migration even if, because of wage and salary levels, it is generally believed to be a 'pipedream', especially for the administrators and professionals who are most needed. There have been periods of return migration, when opportunities in the Cook Islands appeared greater, such as immediately after self-government (cf. Davis, 1975) yet many who have returned have been disillusioned and migrated again. The Cook Islands Development Bank would like to attract Cook Islanders back to take up business opportunities but recognises that, given the difficulties of achieving this in Western Samoa where the context appears more favourable (see Country Report No.22), the chances of success are small. The Department of Development Planning in 1981 were interested in a survey of migrants in New Zealand to indicate what are the prospects of return migration and how these might be increased. Payment of New Zealand pensions

Table 19. Immigrants, 1966-1971.

Place of Residence 1971	Birthplace										Countries						
	Raro-tonga	Aitu-taki	Mangaia	Atiu	Mauke	Mitiaro	Manuae	Palmerston	Puka-puka	Nassau	Manihiki	Rakahanga	Penrhyn	Suvarrow	New Zealand	other than NZ & CI	Total
Cook Islands	205	74	31	32	21	3	3	2	13	-	8	4	14	-	521	75	1,006
Rarotonga	180	23	14	18	10	2	3	2	6	-	7	2	7	-	399	57	730
Aitutaki	5	38	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	35	3	87
Mangaia	8	-	15	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	5	45
Atiu	-	1	-	10	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	17
Mauke	-	-	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	14
Mitiaro	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Manuae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Palmerston	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Rakahanga	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Penrhyn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	6	-	1	-	8
Suvarrow	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Nassau	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Manihiki	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Pukapuka	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	8
New Zealand	12	12	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	60	8	97

Source: Cook Islands Census, 1971 (unpublished tabulations).

in the Cook Islands may well encourage return migration of the elderly (see below), and a greater supply of money in the economy, but will significantly increase the dependency ratio so that this money is unlikely to become available for investment.

Even in the early 19th Century the impact of return migration was apparent in the introduction of new ideas and values which undermined the authority of the chiefs as well as some missionaries, and hastened the end of theological rule (Hayes, 1983). The early missionaries, such as William Gill, were themselves convinced that 'many of the returned migrants were an unsettling influence on island life and formed a "depraved and vicious element" advocating such sins as prostitution and the consumption of fermented liquors' (Gill, 1846, cited by Curson, 1973: 107). Such contemporary characterisations of the impact of early return migration were sharply defined in a way that analysis of contemporary return migration can never be. Indeed, because of its numerical insignificance and the variety of social and economic influences on Cook Islands life (and especially that of remittances), any separate effects of return migration are almost impossible to disentangle. It is, however, significant that a relatively high proportion of the senior public service and politicians in Rarotonga are return migrants, as were Mr. Albert Henry, Mr. Geoffrey Henry and Sir Thomas Davis, a situation which has given a particular European influence to the whole structure of the Cook Islands socio-economy.

#### The Rationale of Migration

Underlying all migration from the country is the fact that since Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand there is no restriction on entry to New Zealand and hence therefore no restriction on further movement between New Zealand and Australia, since there are no restrictions on New Zealand citizens moving there. A major boost to the rate of out-migration was the completion in 1973 (and opening in January 1974) of an airport at Rarotonga that was suitable for jet aircraft, the inauguration of a direct DC8 service to Auckland and the relative decline in the cost of air transport. Whilst these factors explain the relative ease of migration from the Cook Islands to New Zealand they do not explain its growth in importance.

Since there were few fundamental changes in the structure of the Cook Islands economy in the 1960s and early 1970s a substantial part of the reason for increased migration must be attributed to ease of access, reduced cost of transit, the growth of the New Zealand economy, and hence the availability of jobs and higher wages, which provided a greater incentive to migration. The cumulative effects of earlier migration were considerable especially for chain migration. In the early years the shortage of labour resulted in some employers flying prospective workers to New Zealand (cf. Hooper, 1961) and even in the last few years six-month contracts for the Bluff freezing works have been issued in New Zealand. The establishment of Cook Island Maoris in New Zealand has provided a base for further migration, exemplified in the title of a study of Penrhyn Islanders in New Zealand: 'Chain migration, Kinship and Ethnic Concentration' (Brimble, 1976). Increasingly many important decisions concerning migration - especially on employment and fare provision - have been made in New Zealand rather than in the Cook Islands. In the last few years of the 1960's the onset of recession in New Zealand reduced the level of out-migration (Cook, 1969:23), which may have been a result of reduced assistance from migrants already in New Zealand, whilst there was also some return migration to the Cook Islands (op cit:24). The recession of the mid-1970s in the New Zealand economy

resulted in a significant decline in emigration (Table Sixteen), hence the 1977 balance in favour of the Cook Islands was attributed to this recession (Woods, 1978:25), but the decline was small compared with the decline in the numbers of migrants from Western Samoa and Tonga in those years (Walsh, 1982:136). Cook Islanders, as citizens of New Zealand, were able to continue to emigrate freely, and move on to New Zealand, at a time when other Pacific Islanders experienced greater restrictions on migrations and the Cook Islands economy was experiencing a relative downturn.

Economic reasons underlie most current migration moves; thus in Atiu it was observed simply that 'higher income potential and availability of consumer goods were the most frequently stated attractions of such a move' (Stephenson, 1981:117). These kinds of differential, especially between outer islands and New Zealand, are accentuated by changing economic conditions of which falling real costs of migration are not insignificant. Thus Allen noted how in Mangaia there was a substantial increase in migration after 1956 (when 22% of the total population left in a five-year period) because of the New Zealand agricultural export market (Allen, 1969:74,79) and this migration set the social base for further steady out-migration. The single most dramatic year of out-migration was 1974 when the completion of the Rarotonga airport, both provided the means to migrate and resulted in large numbers of unemployed men in a saturated labour market. It has also been suggested that migration from Aitutaki increased significantly after 1978 following the change in government since the post-election distribution of government aid was no longer biased towards Aitutaki, a strong-hold of the defeated Cook Islands Party (T.Jacob, pers.comm, 1981; Tongia, 1979). Party politics have led to serious divisions in the Cook Islands (Prior and Short, 1983:135) and election results have prompted migration from supporters of the losing party who regard themselves as potentially economically disadvantaged (Hayes, 1983). In very general terms although the prices of cash crops have risen in the 1960s and 1970s, they have largely been offset by rising costs of production (because of the necessity for purchased inputs) and marketing. Before the major migration of 1973-4 there had already been a decline in the production of the main cash crops (Taylor, 1980:26). In other words, most small-scale agricultural producers have suffered from the terminal nature (Howlett, 1973) of the peasant mode of production.

Income differentials between the Cook Islands and New Zealand are considerable, and are certainly not decreasing. Comparing average 1975 hourly wage rates in the Cook Islands and New Zealand Hayes recorded that there was an average differential of 3.9:1 but that in manufacturing, an industry particularly favoured by migrants, the differential was 5.1:1 (Hayes, 1983). Salary levels, where comparable, are in roughly the same proportions. Since Cook Islanders as New Zealand citizens have better access to jobs than other migrant groups their probability of unemployment in New Zealand is lower. In these circumstances migration is particularly favoured, even for only a limited time period. Both in 1981 and 1982 the salaries of Cook Islands public servants have been increased substantially in line with increases in the Consumer Price Index, a rise which also enables the maintenance of some degree of comparability with public service wages in New Zealand (and hence may minimise emigration from one of the skilled employment areas that can be least easily replaced within the Cook Islands). The impact of income differentials varies from place to place,

'Real income for land-owning Rarotongans who also have secure employment may compare well with what is available in New Zealand, and this group is less affected by the wage discrepancy than Outer Islanders. And the relative deprivation felt by outer islands migrants in Rarotonga provides an important motive to continue their migratory journey all the way to New Zealand' (Hayes, 1982:117).

Outer Islanders employed at the minimum wage (\$1.06 per hour) are particularly prone to move onwards and outwards, whilst Rarotongans are more easily able to follow a pattern of 'occupational multiplicity' and receive more than one income simultaneously.

Whilst economic reasons may be the primary influence on most moves, migration, even more generally, reflects perceived economic and social inequality. Surveys of migration decisions (made either before or after migration) reveal both the complexity of decision-making and the variety of reasons for migration. Thus surveys in the mid-1960's indicated that most migration was either with relatives or to join relatives, whilst employment or dissatisfaction with island conditions rated less prominence (Curson, 1973a:21). However, since migrants expressed no more than one choice, if that, there is no indication of whether multiple reasons existed which might indicate how many of those travelling with relatives were also seeking employment and so on. A survey at the same time in Tokoroa found that over 50% of Cook Islanders migrated for economic reasons and a further 12% were dissatisfied with island living conditions (Douglas, 1965:15). It is therefore difficult to attribute absolute reliability to such varied survey results, carried out in origins and destinations with different kinds of survey technique, because of their tendency to isolate single factors in what is ultimately a decision which may never have been considered in detail, was a single strand in a complex socio-economic and political system and undoubtedly was never rationalised in the manner that simple social science and developmental enquiry might prefer.

The relative absence of social services on several of the outer islands, especially in the northern group, is also an influence on out-migration. There are no real high schools in the northern group and only Tereora College on Rarotonga provides the final years of sixth-form education; not only does this mean that 'students with the ability and desire to reach the highest levels of education possible in the Cook Islands must reside in or spend most of the year in Rarotonga, and few having done so will return permanently to their home islands' (Walsh, 1982:139) but also that there is a proportionately larger take-up of secondary educational opportunities by residents of Rarotonga, and then by residents of the southern group (*ibid*), which ultimately contributes to a degree of inequality between regions. Migration from north to south to take advantage of educational opportunities compensates for the disadvantages in spatial location. More recently high school classes have been introduced in most of the outer islands and sixth form courses are now possible on Aitutaki and Mangaia (A. Turua, pers. comm., 1982) a situation which is likely to limit rural-urban migration. Medical services are similarly limited on the northern atolls; for example, few dentists ever visit the northern group. A survey of departures from Pukapuka during a twelve-month period in 1978-79 found that 34% of all those leaving for New Zealand went to obtain medical treatment (Hayes, 1983). Thus out-migration for both education and health have internal and international implications.

To some extent it is possible to differentiate the factors influencing migration within the islands and migration between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, although in more recent years these distinctions have become less clear-cut. Much internal migration is a function of education which remains largely oriented to the academic standards of New Zealand, and has a curriculum which matches this orientation. This bias in the education system has been matched by parental attitudes whereby 'education or academic attainment is seen as a vehicle for getting away from agriculture for the child to achieve a measure of social elevation' (Cook, 1969:20); regular cash incomes are favoured, with 'a Government position being considered the plum' (*ibid*), which are better paid and primarily located in Rarotonga. However it may be that these attitudes are less apparent nowadays (A. Turua, pers. comm., 1982). A survey of students at Atiu Junior High School between 1965 and 1968 found that by 1969 of 61 pupils from Atiu, 19 remained there, 41 were on Rarotonga and 1 in New Zealand; of 27 pupils from Mauke, 3 remained on Atiu, 5 had returned to Mauke, 18 were in Rarotonga and 1 in New Zealand. Of 23 pupils from Mitiaro, 4 had returned to Mitiaro and the rest were on Rarotonga (Cook, 1969:19-20). Thus out of 111 pupils, 78 had gone to Rarotonga and only 28 were on their home islands; whilst some migrants may later have returned to their home islands this constitutes a massive out-migration of the most educated young. There is little doubt that these kinds of proportions have also characterised subsequent years, although New Zealand has achieved greater prominence as a destination. Since almost a third of the students from Atiu itself remained there, there is a strong indication that the location of high schools themselves may influence out-migration in that where secondary education is undertaken away from the home island further migration is probable. The context of education remains closely linked to the New Zealand system and subjects of local relevance (Maori language and culture and agriculture) receive low priority since they cannot be taken for New Zealand secondary school exams. The implications for curriculum changes and exam content are considerable yet would be extremely difficult to implement, especially in a context where it was expected that only at the end of 1982 would the first high school (Mangaia College) be entirely staffed by Cook Islanders. Most forms of tertiary education must be undertaken outside the Cook Islands, primarily in New Zealand, and it has been estimated that 75% of all scholarship students do not return to the Cook Islands (Hayes, 1982: 97), which compares with the situation a decade earlier when somewhat more than a third of those who had obtained scholarships overseas had not returned to the Cook Islands (Cook, 1969:49). At that time those who returned to enter government service were liable to obtain a senior position while still relatively young. Consequently, Cook commented 'future returning scholarship holders may find their opportunities for promotion curtailed' (1969:50), a situation which subsequently occurred, discouraging both return migration and employment within the Cook Islands at salary scales not commensurate with those that could be obtained in New Zealand. Currently therefore scholarship holders are encouraged to return into the private sector, and especially the construction sector (A. Turua, pers. comm., 1982). Thus in the 1970's further education, to a greater extent than ever before, became education for migration. The consequent necessity to receive training overseas, is likely to exacerbate this situation. University students usually go to New Zealand rather than the University of the South Pacific in Fiji, although the Cook Islands is part of the USP region and there is a USP centre in Rarotonga. As Hayes phrases it: 'education fosters migration both for what it does and for what it cannot do' (1982:108), and there was a relationship between educational aspirations and the tendency to emigrate (*op cit*:109-110). However, not all those with high education necessarily emigrate. The education system has tended to be oriented towards secondary

education and overseas employment; at a time when the Cook Islands population was growing this was reasonable and logical. Now that population is falling it is no longer reasonable or logical yet there has been no real re-appraisal of the education system and minimal potential for giving it a more traditional, vocationally oriented basis.

On most of the outer islands, with the exception of Aitutaki, the combination of low prices for agricultural goods (especially copra), the lack of opportunities to earn cash income by other means, and the greater availability of income-earning opportunities elsewhere are considerable incentives to migrate. Since population densities in the southern group are low (with the exceptions of Aitutaki and Rarotonga) and environmental conditions are favourable the potential for income-earning through agricultural development exists, but is restricted by constraints of land tenure. Moreover it is extremely difficult for young men to farm independently since they are expected first to have established their own household; out-migration from agriculture may be as much a desire for independence as a dislike of agricultural work and the incomes attached to it. The general problem of access to land was compounded by extremely high fertility rates in the 1960s which placed considerable pressure on the available land resources and resulted in the establishment of self-perpetuating emigration streams.

As elsewhere social pressures are also an influence on migration as the young move to experience a different social environment, but there are also wider social influences that influence migration:

'New Zealand offers a frontier of great expectations and aspirations to many Cook Islanders...For outer islanders (those from outside the main island of Rarotonga) New Zealand means social equality with one's Rarotongan cousins. Outer islanders living in Rarotonga are rarely treated as equals by Rarotongans. As land cannot be bought or sold, outer island migrants have to squat on or lease land belonging to Rarotongans and are therefore traditionally treated as inferior. In New Zealand all Cook Islanders are manuiri (outsiders) and are completely free of social stigmas that are prevalent at home' (George, 1979:167).

This is particularly true for Pukapukans in Rarotonga (Hecht, 1978), explaining their emigration, and is true also of Western Samoa and Niue (Country Report No.11).

Social controls also influence migration; on Atiu a son wishing to migrate first asks permission of his family, permission that might be withheld because the son is the last adult male left at home (Bollard, 1979:19). Household heads may even determine migration patterns, as on Mangaia,

'If the family labour cannot be satisfactorily committed on Mangaia, that is, if individual family members cannot be employed in a way which brings cash income into the house, the family head will commit his labour in the distant New Zealand economy...When a cash income can be found on the island, labour will be committed there, the younger man will be told to stay on Mangaia, or at least urged to return to Mangaia after a short period of exploration in New Zealand' (Allen, 1969:83).

As the extended family has given way to the nuclear family, and monetary wants increased, individual decisions have tended to become more important than group decisions, and those individual decisions are more likely to be oriented to New Zealand. Finally it must be noted that a very large proportion of all international migrants are 'passive migrants', moving with their families or to join family or friends, responding to decisions previously made by others. Perhaps more than in most South Pacific societies 'migration has now become an accepted part of the traditional social structure and mobility is considered a "normal" part of adult life, almost a rite de passage' (Curson, 1973a:24). Increasingly, however, the 'rite of passage' is not a transition within one's own society, as adulthood is gained elsewhere, but a literal passage to another society elsewhere.

The significance of some influences is extremely difficult to interpret. Pukapuka has the lowest rate of emigration of any island and is the only island to experience a continuous population increase from 1966 to 1981; this has been attributed to the possibility that 'cultural conservatism, a high degree of social integration, as well as low cash incomes, can restrain emigration though not eliminate it' (Hayes, 1983) and yet Pukapuka has had a long history of out-migration (Beckett, 1964; Hecht, 1978) and there is a significant Pukapukan community in Wollongong, Australia, a classic example of chain migration (Hambuechen, 1981:25). Indeed, as Hayes suggests (1982:172), it is more likely that some social groups on some islands (specifically Pukapuka and Nassau) simply do not have adequate capital to finance emigration whilst Taylor comments, 'Generally the people who stay are those who cannot go. They are old, infirm, have low 'economic' motivation or have family responsibilities looking after relatives and family land. Otherwise they are young, pre-high school children' (1980:28). But these statements may well be over-emphasising the economic constraints to migration given the significance of tere parties from islands like Pukapuka and the ability of former migrants in New Zealand and Australia to contribute to fares; many Cook Islanders choose to remain because they prefer life in the Cook Islands and not because they lack motivation. The significance of the growing population of Pukapuka, on the most densely-populated island in the country, may well be extremely significant for the Cook Islands. If the explanation rests on 'cultural conservatism', or at least a more strongly maintained commitment to established social and economic practices (including a more Polynesian form of land tenure), rather than the particular significance of any employment or income-generating activities there (which are not immediately apparent), then the potential for emphasizing the Maori elements of Cook Islands society through the education system is apparent.

### The Impact of Emigration

Since the majority of migrants are from the active workforce this has resulted in a high dependency rate (the ratio between those aged 14 and under and 65 and over to those between 15 and 64) although for the country as a whole this has actually fallen since 1966 and 1976 (principally because of a reduction of the rate on Rarotonga). Of neighbouring island groups, only Niue and Tokelau, which both have experienced high emigration rates, have higher dependency rates; for the Cook Islands as a whole the dependency rate (114.6 in 1981) is one of the highest in the South Pacific region (Turua, 1982:9). The rates for Mitiaro and Rakahanga in 1976 were amongst the highest in the world (Hayes, 1979a:12). High dependency places considerable demands on the remaining population and on social welfare services. At least as late as the 1960's there was a substantial sex bias

in out-migration in favour of males and at the end of that decade there were high dependency rates on some islands (Cook, 1969:45) which caused concern over the manning of lighters, as on Mauke, and food production to the extent that it was argued that 'on some islands further migration of the male workforce could have grave consequences on the ability to provide even a basic livelihood' (op cit:46). Selectivity by age necessarily had repercussions for the sending communities, as migration became 'a selective process creaming off the young, the more active and ambitious from the population' (Curson, 1973a:22). Since 1966, and at least until 1981, there has been a female bias in emigration with about 52% of all migrants being female; there is a general pattern of male migration in the 20-29 age group and female migration in the 30-39 age group, suggesting that families are re-uniting overseas. Thus particular sex biases in migration streams tend to eventually balance out and sex bias in migration is no longer important. The principal demographic impact of migration is the decline in birth rate in the Cook Islands, as fertility is transferred to New Zealand, and hence the absolute decline in population.

Since the majority of migrants are from the active workforce, their absence results in significant changes in the domestic division of labour, drawing women, old men and the very young into the labour force, to a much greater extent (cf. Bollard, 1979:18). However, this may not compensate for the loss of a large number of migrants. Moreover it has been suggested that regular remittance payments may encourage many middle-aged and elderly adults to abandon fulltime agricultural activities and become dependent on cash payments from kin (Curson, 1979:194-195). However, while this may have been true in the 1960s it is less likely to be presently true (A.Turua, pers.comm, 1982) because of the increased shortage of agricultural labour. For Aitutaki it has been estimated that by the 1970s the amount of land cultivated was about a third of that in the 1950s, resulting in occasional shortages of root crops (Graves and Graves, 1976: 447), a similar decline to that recorded on Mangaia (Allen, 1969). In the northern group it is unlikely that there are any comparable declines in cultivated area, and hence in agricultural production although much land on Penrhyn is uncultivated (Brimble, 1976). A significant influence on that decline was the impact of the increasing availability of local wage labour (Graves and Graves, 1976:457). Both on Aitutaki (Bassett and Thomson, 1968) and Mauke (Gordon, 1974) a large number of cash crop holdings were owned by absentees; on Mauke the proportion was as high as 42% and no caretaker there, or on Aitutaki, would provide minimal maintenance or invest in improvements without any change in tenure. However, a more recent examination of citrus holdings on Rarotonga indicated that those owned by absentees were no more poorly maintained than those owned by residents (Hayes, 1982:275-6). In general there are labour shortages in the agricultural sector, both for cash crop and food crop production certainly on Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mangaia (Hayes, 1982:274-285), which have minimised the economic potential of the agricultural sector. In the case of Mauke Gordon has recorded how the fragile economy of the island was being undermined by the shortage of labour; moreover 'unstable prices, infrequent shipping, lack of fertiliser, sprays and machinery, petty thieving and pig devastation...are in themselves catalysts which engender the frustration for which emigration is too frequently the outlet' (Gordon, 1974). All of this has a spiralling effect which leads to further emigration; Gordon, not surprisingly, found that 90% of mapu (youth) wished to leave the island. Evidence on more recent declines in agricultural acreage and/or production is unavailable; on Aitutaki, where there has been both mechanisation and the formation of land corporations, agricultural output, at least of cash crops, has probably

increased in the past decade. Thus overall the relationship between migration and agricultural development is unclear although the decline in food crop production is universal.

Problems of fragmented land tenure are exacerbated by the absence of migrants, especially when these are title-holders, because of problems involved in making effective decisions over land use, amalgamation, etc. In general this tends to stifle initiative and the extension of cultivation, and hence tends to aggravate the decline in agricultural production. For example, on Rakahanga, a resident built a house on the land of his father's kin with permission given by resident kin; subsequently migrants returned from Rarotonga and demolished the house (Matheson, 1982:34-35). Both the conflicts between resident and absent land owners are apparent as is the considerable control that absentees can continue to exert, although this case may well be exceptional (A. Turua, pers. comm., 1982). The effect of a combination of the imposition of a legal system that gave rights of inheritance to all children and out-migration (even in the 1950s) is well illustrated in the case of Tengtengi, Atiu. Excluding house-sites and public land there were 78 sections of land on an area of 1,075 acres, with a population of 252, yet land rights had been awarded to 891 particular names and their descendants, giving a total of 6,237 names (or 79.8 living right-holders per section). Of these rights 1,535 were held by residents of Tengtengi, 1,829 by residents of other parts of Atiu; 1,534 right-holders were in Rarotonga, 531 in New Zealand, 150 in Mauke, 155 in Mitiaro, 84 in Mangaia, 167 in Aitutaki, 174 in Manihiki, 60 in Tahiti and 18 elsewhere. Thus only a quarter of the rights were held by Tengtengi residents (Crocombe, 1964:127-8). In general migrants are reluctant to surrender any land rights to non-migrants, a situation familiar throughout the South Pacific yet there are important variations between islands. On Mangaia and Pukapuka where land tenure remains principally regulated by custom, the distribution of land is adjusted frequently by, and for the benefit of, the resident population. On Pukapuka, for example, there is an annual re-division of land and some migrants then return from Rarotonga to protect their land rights (cf. Hayes, 1982:213). By contrast on Rarotonga and Aitutaki, where land tenure is regulated by the Land Court emigrants retain land rights and their absence often means that land is held out of commercial production, and even subsistence production (op cit:213-4). Overall the constraints of land tenure have meant that migration has not enabled the release of land for more extensive agricultural development.

If migrants are to retain commitment to the Cook Islands this might most easily be achieved through commitment to agricultural development schemes and it has been suggested (D.Hunter, pers.comm, 1981) that emigrants should pay an annual registration fee to retain any interest in Cook Islands land; given the extended nature of land ownership this would be extremely difficult to implement and administer. Thus on Rarotonga, where the law allows families to reclaim land given under occupation right if it is not built upon or if a perennial crop has passed its productive stage, families are reluctant to press these issues (Meleisea, 1981:6.11), whereas on Mangaia land can be reallocated and on Atiu, where the tenure situation is similar to that of Rarotonga, there are fewer problems because of lesser population pressure and fewer conflicts of interest between resident and emigrant land owners (op cit:6.12-6.15). Above all land retains its value and social and economic significance as insurance; land use changes are therefore difficult and tenurial change almost impossible.

Emigration has resulted in a considerable skill-drain from the Cook Islands although, because of the high educational standards in the country, not all sixth-form leavers and tertiary graduates could be found appropriate local employment. However, emigration has gone beyond that level; as early as 1968 it was noted that 'many government departments in Avarua find considerable difficulty in keeping their better educated and trained employees' (Curson, 1968:42) and that theme was re-emphasized by Ward who regarded it as the most serious aspect of emigration (1961:9). The emigration of skilled workers has been a constant theme in subsequent studies and continues to be of concern. In 1980 it was noted that the number of doctors had fallen from 20 to 12 in the past couple of years, reducing the availability of health care especially on the outer islands (Heyn, 1980:7-8). Moreover since the government had stopped sending students to the Fiji School of Medicine for training as medical officers and sent them to New Zealand for training as doctors, not a single medical graduate has returned to the Cook Islands so that, for the first time (in recent history), doctors were being recruited from New Zealand (Knowles, 1980:2). Despite increasing public service salaries there is no evidence of this kind of situation changing hence the belief by the Deputy Commissioner of the Public Service Commission 'that training programmes for the Cook Islands should be re-cast and made to respond to domestic, not overseas, requirements and standards' (cf. Groman, 1983:4). For professionals especially there is also little indication of return migration from New Zealand because of the relatively low salaries and high cost of living (that is of consumer goods) in the Cook Islands.

The general impact of rapid and steady out-migration can be summarised as firstly, social disintegration as communities become unbalanced and leaders absent; secondly, the demoralisation of the productive members of the society because of the burden of dependency that is placed upon them which, in some cases, may have brought the size of the productive population to a non-viable level. This is emphasised by some feeling that there is limited incentive for development at home when so much more may be gained by migration. Thirdly, there is increased pressure for administrative and welfare services, as dependency increases, but with a declining resource base to support those services, either in a more self-reliant manner at village level or at national level, thus demanding some diversion of resources from other activities or a decline in the provision of basic needs. And, fourthly, the declining domestic market offers decreasing opportunities for economic development and diversification, and a shortage of skilled labour for new activities, whilst the costs of providing economic infrastructure (especially communications) increases. These negative effects of migration may be offset and compensated by the flow of remittances into the country.

Perhaps the most significant impact of out-migration on the Cook Islands is through the provision of remittances which constitute a higher proportion of cash incomes in the country than perhaps anywhere else in the South Pacific. Whilst current estimates suggest that remittances may represent as much as 20% or more of the GNP, these high levels follow correspondingly high levels of recent out-migration and may be expected to decline over time, similar to the manner in which this has happened in Niue (Country Report No.11). This decline is accentuated by the increased formation of nuclear and extended families within New Zealand and the growth of social and economic commitments there. Nonetheless, within New Zealand there is some social pressure to 'ensure that migrants are aware of their social and economic obligations to their village kin' (Curson, 1979:191) and, in earlier times, the Cook Islands administration insisted that married

male prospective migrants signed agreements to regularly remit a certain amount of money (ibid). This formal pressure no longer exists. The most comprehensive examination of the level of remittances to the Cook Islands has been undertaken by Hayes (1982:363-372) and this analysis is both the most detailed available for a national economy in the South Pacific and a clear indication of the pitfalls involved in attempting to estimate the significance of remittances at a national level. As elsewhere remittances were bi-directional but the ratio of goods to cash remained constant over a period of almost two decades (op cit:365), in contrast to the situation in most other parts of the South Pacific where the proportion of cash has increased, further indicating the high cost of consumer goods in the Cook Islands. Over the decade 1967-1976 there was a more or less steady increase in the level of remittances from \$594,000 to \$1,383,000 whose contribution to GNP therefore increased from 11% to 21%. However, although GDP increased, the rate of increase was less than that of remittances, primarily because of the decline in the value of agricultural exports, a strong indication of the relationship between remittances, the reduction of interest in agricultural development and the strengthening of 'dependency' on the New Zealand economy. Thus whilst 'emigration results in a serious monetary loss for the Cook Islands "economy" as an abstract entity there is no doubt that individual emigrants benefit financially from the higher wages and salaries (and purchasing power) available to them in New Zealand' (Hayes, 1982:374). It is in this nexus between the social and economic costs of emigration and the private economic and social benefits that decisions over migration-related policies must be located.

In Mangaia in 1966 remittances averaged about \$130 per household, a substantial amount since at the time only 18% of the Mangaian population otherwise received cash incomes (Curson, 1979:188). On Atiu remittances in 1974 averaged \$292 per household, some 22% of average cash incomes (Bollard, 1979:55). Data on the contemporary distribution of remittances by island appears otherwise largely unavailable (cf. Hayes, 1982:100). However, remittances for a three-month period of 1968 from New Zealand to the Cook Islands ranged in total value from \$16,187 to Rarotonga and \$7,979 to Aitutaki to \$72 to Penrhyn and \$80 to Manihiki, for the nine islands for which data was available (Cook, 1969:25-28). Whilst the southern group received substantially more money than the northern group in proportion to their resident populations, there is no indication if this correlates with the proportion of migrants from those islands. It does, however, demonstrate the much greater availability of cash in the southern islands and also suggests both the possibly greater significance of remittances in the northern islands, where other sources of cash income are extremely limited, and the contribution that remittances make to income inequalities between islands.

Dependence on remittances is often extreme; on Atiu in 1974 there were thirteen households without a single active male, hence many of these received large remittances from emigrant husbands and children (Bollard, 1979:18). Remittances constituted 22% of all household incomes at that time, compared with 63% from wages and 6% from cash cropping (op cit:55). In the 1960s Curson found that 32% of all households in three wards of Avarua received remittances from New Zealand, although 61% of households had at least one relative there (1979:192-193). In Amuri village, Aitutaki, at much the same time, remittances ranged from 0% to 80% of household incomes (Johnston, 1967:39) and the overall income from remittances was higher than that from agricultural production. Data on the distribution of remittances are limited, especially for the northern group, but do indicate the considerable but variable dependency on remittances. There is some evidence

that migration and remittances contribute to inequality; on Atiu households with absent relatives often received large gifts from the absentees, whilst this was accentuated by migrants leaving cash crop stands to the remaining relatives (Bollard, 1979:103). The extent to which this is more generally true has not been recorded.

Remittances are also sent from Rarotonga to the outer islands; in the mid-1960s remittances represented 'a considerable proportion of the weekly wage' (Cook, 1969:29) and a small number of members of the public service had regular deductions made from their fortnightly pay to be sent to the outer islands (op cit:30). At that time remittances to the outer islands appeared to be increasing as migration from the islands also increased. Outer islanders in Rarotonga 'send food and money to relatives on their home island to ensure that their children have access to land. They also save money to build a house and thus secure the site' (Taylor, 1980:35). This element of social insurance may be more marked within the Cook Islands than beyond, although there are multiple reasons for sending remittances, including the purchase of basic consumption goods (A. Turua, pers. comm., 1982). There is considerable seasonality of remittances. For the island of Penrhyn Cook recorded remittances over a five-month period including December, which indicated that in December \$205 were received and for the other four months \$157 (Cook, 1969:28) a seasonal trend which is marked throughout the Cook Islands and has subsequently been emphasized by the custom of migrants returning at that time and bringing cash with them, often in large travelling tere parties. The conspicuous consumption involved in this brief return migration, at a time when many youths have just left school, may not have found jobs and may be given their fares to New Zealand, combine to induce further emigration.

As elsewhere in the South Pacific the principal use of remittances within the Cook Islands has been the purchase of consumer goods (e.g. Gordon, 1974). As Gordon notes, on the context of Mauke; 'there appears to be a perceived element of social status in possessing the buying power to indulge in canned luxuries with the net result that traditional dependence on customary fishing and planting are relegated to lesser positions' (1974). Even more characteristically remittances are spent on housing, as for example at Arorangi (Bassett, 1969:54) and in Mangaia (Allen, 1969:78) but particularly on the northern atolls where alternative uses of income are extremely limited, either for consumption or investment. This has been the major aim of migrants for at least two decades (cf. Crocombe, 1974:76). Some remittances have gone into house building projects on the north coast of Rarotonga that can be rented to those working in town, and hence may further benefit the migrants rather than those who have remained.

An important use of remittances is for the financing of the migration of remaining members of the migrant's family or other relatives in the Cook Islands; remittances thus function 'as an agent of active migration' (Curson, 1979:194). In the early post-war years the earnings of migrants in Makatea, and in Rarotonga, financed their own subsequent migration to New Zealand (Hooper, 1961:12; Curson, 1979:188; Crocombe, 1974:76). Unlike in other South Pacific contexts there appears to have been relatively little investment of remittances in agricultural development projects, suggesting the limited extent and intent of return migration, and in some areas there is also concern that such investment would give migrants greater influence in local decision-making related to land use and especially land tenure.

In some parts of the Cook Islands, notably Aitutaki, remittances are channelled into village projects, notably the construction of village halls, which has resulted in the expenditure of \$500,000 in the past five years, as villages compete to construct the largest halls, which are under-used to the extent that they can be regarded as 'white elephants' (Peat, 1981; Cook Islands News, 3 December 1981). Thus a substantial proportion of remittances are diverted into prestigious projects both because there are limited alternative development opportunities and because migrants prefer to retain and develop a traditional image of Cook Islands life. Migrants, whilst individually often innovative, are often extremely conservative in relation to their home society, a factor which tends to further constrain local economic development.

As elsewhere the impact of migration cannot be distinguished from other social and economic changes, relating to such phenomena as cash cropping, education, tourism and so on, and these changes have increasingly drawn the Cook Islands towards more western life styles. Thus Graves and Graves (1978, 1979) have noted on Aitutaki the growing trends towards individualism, increasing social conflicts between young and old, the movement of younger, western-educated, English speakers into positions of local power and increases in stress-related diseases; these trends are summed up in the title of one paper 'The Impact of Modernization on the Personality, of a Polynesian People: Or, How to make an Uptight, Rivalrous, Westerner Out of an Easy-Going, Generous Pacific Islander' (Graves and Graves, 1978). Yet not all modern changes are as negative as the Graves suggest; transport improvements enable greater ease of access to medical care, which itself is improving, and a number of technological innovations are of considerable value. Social and economic change undoubtedly disrupt traditional forms of social organisation but there are often material benefits. Change is far from even throughout the Cook Islands; Rarotonga is, in some respects, strongly urban, at least in its employment structure and population density (although Pukapuka has a much higher density) and Aitutaki shares many 'modern' characteristics whereas on Atiu recent trends in 'westernisation' may not have produced such significant social change (Stephenson, 1981:117) and in the northern group changes have been even more limited, especially compared with the dramatic 19th Century impact of missionisation and education.

The problems of emigration and population decline are perhaps best illustrated by the case of Palmerston, which has been relatively well documented (Pryor, 1980a and b; Crocombe, 1974), although the extremely small population (51 in 1981) gives it greater comparability with Pitcairn (Country Report No.15) and the smallest atolls of central Micronesia (Country Report No.3) than with other parts of the Cook Islands. There is a considerable burden of dependency; in 1981 there were only seven males between the ages of 15-44 on the atoll (a particular problem when natural hazards occur and rehabilitation of gardens must be undertaken) hence local production is limited. Inherent problems of small size are aggravated by land fragmentation, remoteness (thus limiting services, the supply of provisions and access to markets), but these problems have hitherto been overcome because 'the atoll gets its fair share of expenditure, due in part to efficient lobbying by Palmerston people resident in Rarotonga' (Prior, 1980a:35) hence there are some government jobs fairly evenly distributed between the three lineages. Almost entirely through government aid Palmerston, like Pitcairn, has retained a population beyond the time when outsiders anticipated its abandonment. But problems remain,

'In the past Palmerston Islanders were able to live in isolation on the natural resources available to them; however, now they have chosen to become dependent on goods acquired with cash from Rarotonga. In addition, they have become more dependent on the government to provide them with facilities, salaries, services and emergency aid. What lies ahead for the Palmerston people? The rate of emigration is such that it is not difficult to imagine abandonment of the atoll by its inhabitants, especially if they are badly struck by natural disaster again. The unavailability of marriage partners, the social strain of constant feuding between lineages, and the limited opportunity for education and entertainment will probably make emigration to the "urban" center of Rarotonga attractive, travelling routinely by boat to the atoll that was once their home (Pryor, 1980b:156).

At a micro-scale, or 'in a test-tube' (Crocombe, 1974), Palmerston exemplifies the problems of small, remote islands within a global economy. As long as governments are willing to provide aid, (and the Cook Islands government set aside \$42,000 in January 1982 for developing Palmerston's fisheries) outlying atoll populations will survive until the burden of dependency becomes intolerable. Without return migration this may not be long distant in the case of Palmerston. Not only for Palmerston, but for the country as a whole, slowing the emigration rate and encouraging some return migration appear of growing importance.

### Conclusion

The Cook Islands is heavily dependent on foreign aid, technology and expertise, whilst imports have steadily increased relative to exports, thus contributing to an increased trade deficit. The two principal elements of the economy - agriculture and tourism - are essentially static and are highly dependent on outside markets as is fishing, a possible area of expansion. In parallel with other aspects of the economy, the Cook Islands is also dependent on overseas opportunities for migration and employment, and remittances make an important contribution to the economy. There is no indication that this dependence on the overseas economy is likely to diminish, although it may diversify, in the foreseeable future, since rural development, and hence the generation of permanent employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, have been largely unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that the local labour force is steadily declining through migration a major task of development remains that of creating more jobs and income-earning opportunities, especially in the private sector. Moreover the workforce is young, especially in the public service, so that opportunities for advancement are limited. Employment in agriculture (especially in Rarotonga) and fishing has fallen steadily since the 1960s. With wage and salary levels in New Zealand that are four or five times those of the Cook Islands (when jobs are available) these trends are scarcely surprising. Thus, whilst the principal opportunities for employment are within the agricultural sector, there is a shortage of agricultural labour, much unused land and migration from this sector has been most rapid. A further area of concern is the employment of school leavers to minimise the massive out-migration from this age group at the end of the school year; at

the moment there is no clear indication of what does happen to school leavers - in terms of their work experiences, migration behaviour and aspirations - and this is one area where the further analysis that is now being undertaken would be useful. It is also in this area of youth employment, and the long-term effect of out-migration, that public awareness is most limited and workshops that could influence public opinion (as have previously been successful in Kiribati) would be useful.

The two countries in the South Pacific that are most affected by out-migration are the Cook Islands and Niue (Country Report No.11) and, whilst there are positive benefits from migration for both individuals and communities, concern has been mounting in both those countries over what appears to be an excessive rate of out-migration, with the inevitable loss of human resources, and the slow decline in the absolute population size (even more apparent in Niue) with its consequent implications for the viability of the country as a whole. It is in these two countries (and also Pitcairn) that there is even physical evidence of out-migration; empty houses and uncultivated land are the visible symbols of economic and social decline. The Cook Islands is the largest country in the South Pacific with a falling population and a shrinking labour force. One strand of development policy has therefore been that of slowing or reversing international migration; to do this policy has been oriented towards the provision of basic needs, raising living standards and generating employment at wage and salary scales comparable with those of New Zealand. In a static economy with a worsening trade gap this is a massive task and is hampered by the limited availability of administrative manpower, by rapidly rising transport costs by the decline of the agricultural sector and, by the fact that the Cook Islands is self-governing but in free association with New Zealand. There is little optimism about the prospects of long-term economic development in the Cook Islands and a mood of despondency in relation to migration scarcely matched elsewhere in the South Pacific. This however has, perhaps inevitably resulted in an emerging re-appraisal of migration as being a process that benefits the Cook Islands (and the migrants themselves).

A number of factors further suggest that emigration from the Cook Islands is at least as likely to increase in the immediate future as to decrease. Firstly, the Cook Islands economy is experiencing considerable difficulties especially in the small productive sector and there is little indication that this will improve; consequently, unless aid increases and the government sector is able to provide additional employment (much of which will be unproductive), then the future supply of jobs will continue to fall as the domestic market declines and economies of scale diminish. Secondly, the New Zealand and, increasingly, Australian economies remain able to provide a range of well-paid employment opportunities to which Cook Islanders have full rights of access. There is no reason to suppose that these will dwindle significantly although this remains the most probable constraint to continued out-migration, or even return migration. Thirdly, there are now more Cook Islanders outside the country than remain in it, hence Cook Islanders, on average, have more relatives outside the country than in it and with the 'export of fertility' this is becoming rapidly more apparent. The existence of distant relatives provides a base for movement and emigration, a social rationale or excuse for migrating and, often, the finance to do so. Fourthly, most assumptions that emigration will decline have been based on population projections that indicated declining populations in the principal migrating age groups (e.g. Van Os, 1977); however, the effect of this decline has placed considerable stress on the Cook Islands economy and those in the 'dependent' age-groups have fewer

local relatives on whom to depend and therefore themselves become more likely to migrate and form extended families overseas. In 1969 it was noted that 'the reports of people who have migrated and found jobs induces a cumulatively greater rate of migration if nothing is done to break the cycle' (Cook, 1969:22). In the past decade this is exactly what has happened and the point remains valid. The temptation to assume that at some future point in time emigration will be overtaken by natural increase (e.g. Bellam, 1981:12) must therefore be resisted. Conclusions made in 1977 that, '...it appears to be highly probable that a reversal of the present development into a substantial growth of the population is beyond reality. A perhaps slowed down decline resulting into a more or less stable population figure seems to be a more realistic expectation' (Van Os, 1977:73) have themselves become, in the past half decade, somewhat optimistic.

In the 1950s, the fact that migration reduced population pressure, and the loss of labour was more than compensated by remittances (which, in the 1960s, represented a higher proportion of cash incomes than they do now), resulted in migration being largely considered positive as, in many respects, it always had been in Cook Islands society. Even in the present era of population decline this positive evaluation of migration has been scarcely changed, although there has necessarily been some re-appraisal. In the mid-1970's, the Prime Minister noted,

'From the point of view of our future development, the recent trend in emigration is alarming...About 75 per cent of the emigrants are young families and young adults. These constitute the important part of the labour force without which development programmes would be difficult to initiate and sustain...This general migration has taken with it qualified school teachers, carpenters, mechanics and other skilled and semi-skilled persons' (Davis, 1975:75).

The answer to this problem was then seen as establishing more manufacturing industries and encouraging the return migration of some of those then working in New Zealand factories (*ibid*). In 1981 the Minister of Economic Development expressed the same concern:

'We've got to develop positive policies to keep the people here. That obviously means the identification of a future here by the people. That entails housing, finance to get Cook Islanders into business, and the development of a sound education system that will teach the necessary skills to keep the people here. Since we've been in government we've worked to bring the wage and salary scale up...The second thing we've done is to get more people away on training now than ever before, the idea being that they can bring skills back and utilise them here. The third thing we've done is to expand housing greatly' (Ingram, 1981:25).

The first aim of the first Development Plan equally stresses the significance of reducing migration. However within the Plan, although manpower policy is aimed at encouraging skilled Cook Islanders to remain and it is noted that the 'manpower training programme can only occur in the context of an economic and social development programme aimed at restraining the population from leaving the country', the actual attitude to migration

is ambivalent: 'While migration has resulted in a substantial loss of Cook Islanders, especially those having educational qualifications, it has had a beneficial effect in that serious unemployment within the country has not occurred'. The last Prime Minister, Mr. G. Henry, has recently commented extensively on the significance of emigration,

'..to an extent it is a matter of concern and you would probably find that the economists of today would regard it as a major problem. I'm not so concerned, nor do I regard it as a major problem. Certainly we are losing some of our more industrious people, they are travelling to overseas countries, looking for greener pastures. I know of no surefire way of stopping them from leaving the country, and in any case I'm not sure that I would want to stop them. I'll tell you why. Last year, for example, and at the beginning of this year, we've had groups of people travelling to New Zealand to raise funds for a variety of community projects. One team went and came back with \$60,000 after being in New Zealand for just 10 days. Another team went and came back in two weeks with \$88,000. A team from Mangaia went and came back with \$80,000. That's a lot of money coming in over a short time, and it's an amount of money which could not be found here in the Cook Islands, no matter how hard the people here worked to get it. We really are in the business of the export of people. The fact that there are something like 20,000 Cook Islanders in New Zealand is good for us. For example, every time a group of people go to New Zealand to raise funds, the 20,000 Cook Islanders there are putting up the money to send back home. On top of this come particularly the Christmas periods when a lot of money is remitted home by Cook Islanders. Anything up to \$250,000 is coming at that time from Cook Islanders living overseas. In a sense I'm not worried about more Cook Islanders being in Australia. In fact I'm looking forward to that (cited in Pacific Islands Monthly, 54(3), August 1983:11).

There is therefore a powerful body of opinion that is not concerned that the high level of international migration constitutes a problem. Moreover, allied to this, is the fact that the remedies for emigration have been difficult to determine and difficult to put into practice. Even skills learnt in New Zealand have too often been useless in the Cook Islands (Hayes, 1982). As the Director of the ILO Office in the South Pacific recently concluded, 'the authorities are, paradoxically, both helpless and hopeful that someone, somehow, might suggest remedial action; in the meantime population in the Cook Islands is dwindling from one plane to the other going to New Zealand' (Groman, 1981:4). It is, however, within this paradox that the policy solutions are to be found.

The paradox lies in the fact that there are broadly two policy strategies, one which involves the acceptance of migration, and its attendant effects, as a continuous process that will eventually level out and perhaps stabilise at a lower level. The second option involves relatively drastic steps to halt or even reverse the population decline,

involving a number of (sometimes conflicting) strategies of different kinds. By not deliberately choosing the second option the first has hitherto prevailed. These options may now be considered in greater detail.

The first option recognises that while contemporary economic and social conditions remain broadly unchanged in New Zealand, Australia and the Cook Islands then migration will continue but it assumes that at some future time the population of the Cook Islands may stabilise. The evidence, however, suggests that there is no reason why population migration should actually diminish in the foreseeable future; for example, out-migration has continued at roughly the same rate despite fluctuations in the New Zealand economy (which experienced a downturn after 1974) whilst high dependency rates put strong pressure on the remaining fertile and active population to migrate. Since no countries in the South Pacific have become depopulated it is extremely improbable that the decline will always continue but when and at what level it will stabilise remains unknown; the experience of Niue suggests only that the decline may not result in the population halving but it also suggests that the spectre of continuing out-migration will never be completely exorcised. The climatic and landscape attractions of the Cook Islands will always remain along with the relative ease (at least on the southern group) of maintaining subsistence production, with low inputs of energy, as attractive features of the country. Associated with continued future decline would be a number of phenomena that cause concern: increased dependence on New Zealand (or other overseas) aid (as economic production declines and exports fall) so that social services are maintained, the depopulation of smaller islands such as Palmerston, a dependence on government employment as much the most important source of employment (as on Niue) but some possible expansion of a vicarious form of tourism (as migrants and their descendants seek to rediscover their 'roots'), a decline in amenities such as cinemas and other forms of recreation accompanied by a continued decline in morale. In this context the experience of Niue and, to a lesser extent Pitcairn, is of some concern as a model of future Cook Islands non-development. This option thus depends, in part, on the maintenance of aid at high levels; if aid were to fall the material benefits of life in the Cook Islands would also decline and the remaining employment opportunities decline further. It is the downward spiral, whether or not accompanied by falling external assistance, that causes the greatest concern and despondency.

There are, however, potential policies that might ameliorate the effects of a continuing decline in population. Firstly, it is not inconceivable that external aid could increase and diversify, a situation over which the Cook Islands has relatively little control but, despite some successful attempts to diversify aid source, the Cook Islands situation relative to New Zealand has tended to discourage other potential aid donors. Secondly, the level of remittances per capita (in the Cook Islands) could increase and be diverted into productive investment although it is more probable that they will decline over time. Thirdly, continued out-migration offers an increased possibility of land reform and consolidation and hence agricultural development, although the experience of Pitcairn (Country Report No.15) suggests that this would be extremely difficult to achieve. Proposals have been made to form land companies (similar to New Zealand Maori land corporations) to transform fragmented areas with multiple owners into large single production units; in five years of self-government little had been achieved (Crocombe, 1971:67) but a decade later there were some land corporations, at least on Aitutaki. To achieve substantial success with land reform, 'would take a bold government to introduce the necessary legislation and a vigorous administration to implement it, but the

government which carries out a comprehensive programme of land reform will also earn the credit for giving the Cook Islands a new basis for rural economic growth' (op cit: 67-68). There are some possibilities, through community education in the Cook Islands, of better access by the young to agricultural land, and in New Zealand, of greater flexibility in migrant attitudes to land tenure and land development. Fourthly, the economy of the metropolitan countries and social conditions there may deteriorate to the extent that return migration would be a more viable possibility. (The transfer of Cook Islands pension rights to the Cook Islands has enabled the probability of return migration, at least for the retired population, to be much greater, although the effect of this transfer is not yet known). The extension of this principal has been proposed in terms of the transfer of New Zealand superannuation benefits to the Cook Islands, and this proposal has been discussed in New Zealand; significantly New Zealand was concerned that it be protected from similar claims from countries such as Western Samoa and Fiji, which did not share New Zealand citizenship or currency (Cook Island News, 9 December 1982). Fifthly, the decline might be offset by allowing the immigration of non Cook Islanders. Migration restrictions are currently considerable; although Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens other New Zealanders are not allowed to reside there without a permit and even 'permanent residence permits' are revocable (Crocombe, 1981:189). Moreover when a work permit was granted to a Chinese chef in 1980, it was recorded that, 'the reaction of many Cook Islanders bordered on the hysterical...Cook Islanders share the widespread tendency in the Pacific of looking down upon people to the west of them, and had very derogatory attitudes towards Fijians' (op cit:195). Whilst such attitudes might change, the prospect of migration from elsewhere in the Pacific, and especially from beyond the Pacific, are extremely small and the problems that this might pose for land tenure and job distribution are considerable. Sixthly, the discouragement of family planning and the encouragement of greater fertility would result in a population increase in the Cook Islands; however 'clearly any policy which aimed to repopulate the country would be self-defeating insofar as the dependency ratio would simply increase and this would lower average welfare' (Hayes, 1983). None of these possibilities are very great and could not be depended upon to slow population migration or encourage return migration.

An extension of this theme is that of taxing the income of migrants at their destination (New Zealand) so that this taxation might be remitted to the Cook Islands. In supporting such a policy Woodward (1981) has pointed out that the taxation paid by Cook Islanders in New Zealand may be greater than the direct financial contribution made by New Zealand to the Cook Islands (including expatriate salary supplementation) (cf. Hayes, 1982a:376-7). Whilst a version of this policy has been used in a number of Asian countries, primarily to tax the remittances of short-term labour migrants in the Middle East, there is little possibility of its being applied in the Cook Islands for a number of reasons. Firstly, Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand and not necessarily short-term labour migrants with families at home and a clear commitment to return enforced by labour contracts. It would be impossible to differentiate short-term migrants, long-term migrants and perhaps even those born or raised in New Zealand. Secondly, any attempt to develop retrospective taxation would be firmly resisted. Thirdly, taxation has only been attempted in countries where there are other forms of relatively strong intervention and controls on population movements and growth and on taxation. Fourthly, there is a strong conviction within the Cook Islands that migration is an inalienable right directed towards individual self-betterment and that taxation (or other control over benefits) would act against individual enterprise and

reduce remittances to the relatives of migrants even though it is apparent from the previous section that remittances almost totally fail to stimulate long-term development but rather contribute to the increasing consumption of imported goods and is thus opposed to a more self-reliant development. Fifthly, any possible scheme would necessitate the cooperation, and administration, of the New Zealand government; indeed the most viable scheme would be one negotiated directly between the two governments to enable a block transfer of funds on an inter-country basis rather than the taxation of individual workers. On the other hand if New Zealand were to cooperate on such a scheme other problems would be reduced. For all these reasons, alongside the fact that this has never been formally suggested in the Cook Islands, this appears to be an improbable option to slow migration or derive financial gain from its benefits. The possibilities of gaining, in any way other than through individual remittances, from continued out-migration are therefore extremely small.

The strategy of slowing or reversing the population decline by more direct intervention represents the second option, broadly designed to increase the relative benefits of remaining in (or returning to) the Cook Islands relative to those benefits in the possible destinations. Since New Zealand (and Australian) wages and salaries are many times greater than those in the Cook Islands, educational and medical facilities are better and the 'bright lights' are more powerful, policies directed towards increasing the material rewards of remaining in the Cook Islands will never achieve parity with the metropolitan countries. However, the only viable strategy is in the direction of a greater degree of economic development, through agricultural development and diversification, transport improvements and so on, that would contribute to some increase in income levels. Since these could never be commensurate with those in the metropolitan countries this would have to be accompanied by an increase in economic self-reliance, through increased food production, etc., alongside greater cultural self-reliance (such as within education and radio programme content). The elements of such a policy redirection are clear: agricultural development policies that stress diversification and food crop production (whilst simultaneously encouraging the extension of cash cropping and, for the northern group, new coconut varieties and replanting schemes, to ensure some necessary cash income); land tenure reform and the taxation of unused agricultural land; increasing concentration on the exploitation and development of the marine resources that are the most obvious base of both export growth and improved nutrition; transport and energy policies that move away from the use of non-renewable resources; job sharing (perhaps along Mitiaro lines); improved infrastructures (wharfs, aid posts, etc.); and so on.

However, these strategies are essentially strategies appropriate to countries such as Kiribati or Tuvalu, that are also nation states and not incorporated, in whatever limited manner, into a more distant metropolitan nation, since self-reliance also usually entails reducing dependence on imported 'necessities' including foods, oil products, capital equipment and also expertise. This involves changing consumption patterns as well as increasing local productive capacity. Policies would be needed to change living styles at given income levels - using taxes, price policies, advertising and perhaps rationing. This might also involve increasing national ownership of assets and improving national capacity for negotiating with trans-national corporations and metropolitan countries especially, in this context, those with fishing fleets (cf. Seers, 1977a). In short, self-reliance entails a more selective approach to external influences of all kinds. In keeping with this orientation is the idea that factors that

were previously regarded as 'obstacles' to development, such as nationalism, a separate language, traditional customs and so on, appear now rather as shields against the expense and inappropriateness of modern consumption styles and technologies (Seers, 1977b). In general, strategies directed towards self-reliance involve considerable constraints over certain aspects of life-style, thus the problems of redirection towards self-reliance are considerable, not only because of demands for consumption goods (such as motorcycles) within a country like the Cook Islands but also because of the political problems involved in imposing policies that involve constraints when there are no restrictions on migration away from those constraints.

Thus development strategies involving self-reliance may fail to meet the aspirations of the mobile young, especially as they run counter to perceived trends in metropolitan countries, and are (like land tenure reform) inherently difficult to implement. Self-reliant options would certainly increase income and employment disparities between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. Development requires not only government policy initiatives but also self-help and community involvement. Given the constraints of more than lingering demands for the prestige associated with modernisation, westernisation and urban-industrial development and the difficulties attached to establishing rural projects (which are rarely prestigious), and where concerted comprehensive policy formation in loosely structured, democratic states is already difficult to achieve (and development plans are sometimes non-existent), prescriptions that focus primarily on self-reliance, rather than on interdependence, are unlikely to be acceptable in an extremely open economy such as that of the Cook Islands.

Amongst the development strategies pursued by the Cook Islands government, almost all of which are directed to raising the living standards of the population (by agricultural development, infrastructure provision, etc.), there are some that are directed towards a greater degree of self-reliance, such as an increased food crop production and local food consumption and the expansion of marine production, emphasized by some attempt to improve welfare and income-earning opportunities especially on the outer islands. Capital availability through aid provision has enabled considerable investment in some areas (such as for fishing development on Palmerston). However, in a small economy beset by a range of macro-economic problems the possibilities are limited and the determination to achieve significant change is not surprisingly sometimes absent. This is perhaps best illustrated in the response of the last Prime Minister, Mr. G. Henry, to a question on the problem of emigration and the loss of skills in the Cook Islands to which he responded:

'[This] will always be a problem. Some years ago the theory was that people were leaving the outer islands for Rarotonga and then on to New Zealand because that's where the jobs were. So the idea was to establish industry in the outer islands so that people will stay where the work is. I don't believe this is entirely true. The fact is Cook Islanders have itchy feet, they love travelling and will move from one place to the next if they have the means to do it. Its unfortunate that its the industrious that do move on. I don't believe that its because they are looking for better jobs so much as it is that they are now able to do some travelling. They've got the money so they move on. I believe that if you supply the outer islands with a larger source of income, more then move than before' (cited in Pacific, 7(1), 1982:70).

Whilst the observations on the reasons for mobility may be open to debate, there is little room for debate over the degree of dependency that marks this statement (which is not untypical of that of other political leaders) and, consequently, the limited returns that are expected to derive from policies such as that of development of the outer islands. Ultimately therefore it is not that there are no appropriate policies, it is that even the more straightforward proposals are now viewed with a certain degree of pessimism, let alone more radical proposals demanding greater self-reliance and hence constraints.

It is apparent in the context of more radical proposals that there are other possible policies that would slow migration, which involve direct controls over migration. Again proposals to restrict migration in some way have not even been discussed (let alone seriously considered) within the Cook Islands because of general opposition to any restriction on the freedom of individual movement; since Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand there is complete freedom of movement between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, and therefore Australia, hence no real possibility of devising controls or quotas without constitutional changes. (In this context it is significant that perhaps the most effective control over out-migration has been the lack of transport and the high cost of transport; these can be influenced). Ultimately it is argued by some that the increasing dependency on New Zealand alongside continued out-migration to New Zealand (a situation similar to that of Niue, Pitcairn, to a lesser extent, Tokelau and, in a different context, the Northern Marianas and American Samoa) can only be arrested by a declaration of Independence that would result in all Cook Islanders making a decision on their nationality so that future migration would be determined according to the same kinds of quota and familial arrangements that relate to Western Samoa migration to New Zealand. One almost certain outcome of any declaration of Independence would be an initial massive out-migration similar to that when Surinam became independent from the Netherlands (cf. Van Os, 1977: 68-9). Whilst it offers some prospects of long-term population stability or increase it is not a decision that would either be considered or receive general support. For many leading politicians (and, to a lesser extent businessmen), as Crocombe describes of the late Albert Henry, their 'life-style tends to be European in private and Maori in public' (1979:54) and ties with New Zealand are strongly cherished. When the present Prime Minister recently criticised Air New Zealand aviation policy (and specifically their purchase of new jets that were deemed to be less useful to the Cook Islands) he was rebuked by an opposition MP for criticizing 'his own airline' (Cook Islands News, 17 July 1982). Cook Islanders are therefore extremely strongly influenced, more so than in most other countries in the South Pacific (other than Guam the Northern Marianas and Pitcairn), by European values and their social and economic ties with New Zealand are highly valued, to the extent that generally stronger rather than weaker ties to New Zealand are preferred (cf. Trumbull, 1977:162). Population decline was not an electoral issue in 1978 or in 1983 and has not been a political issue in between politicians and business leaders prefer to retain strong ties with New Zealand, which a more self-reliant Cook Islands would inevitably weaken. There are considerable economic benefits from these ties and the imposition of radical policies would certainly countenance electoral defeat for whichever of the two main parties were to subscribe to them. In a relatively evenly-balanced democratic system the adoption of radical policies is therefore extremely improbable without a wider consensus.

All the evidence indicates therefore that there will be no radical approach to emigration but that policies will continue to seek out more productive development and employment opportunities in the Cook Islands. Because of existing constraints the degree of inequality between the Cook Islands and New Zealand is unlikely to decrease and, as the population falls, the degree of dependency on New Zealand will increase, especially where this results in such events as the closure of the Teachers College. In this context the 1979 South Pacific Agricultural Survey provided what has been described as 'a realistic view of the Cook Islands over the immediate future' (Taylor, 1980:16) namely that,

'The future then, must be one of closer links to New Zealand, with increased trade, greater tourist flows and more frequent movement of Cook Islanders between the two countries. The longer term solution might be the absorption of the islands more completely into the New Zealand economy with similar economic values operating in the Cook Islands as in New Zealand. There seems no good reason why, in time, the Cook Islands may not achieve in New Zealand terms, a similar position to that which Tasmania enjoys in the Australian Commonwealth - largely self-governing, highly productive in specialised areas and operating almost entirely within the mainland economy, though not able to support the total level of services it enjoys and thus dependent on more productive or less disadvantaged areas to provide subsidies for its domestic budget' (Ward and Proctor, 1980:379-380).

It is in this context, of continued support from outside, that the present limited interest in migration policy must be viewed. Underlying this view is that out-migration is 'a cherished privilege' (Trumbull, 1977:166) that cannot be directly curtailed but may only be slowed by piecemeal economic development. The disadvantages are likely therefore to remain.

It is not only difficult for any government to adopt radical policies but even more difficult when migration is a right and a privilege and has obvious benefits at an individual level, benefits which most politicians and public servants have experienced at some time. Individual Cook Islanders have also benefited from some of the structural changes in the Cook Islands economy. Thus Hayes notes, in terms of individuals (rather than the socio-economy as a whole),

'Given the social and economic changes which have occurred in the past thirteen years, the question now is whether Cook Islanders in general are prepared to accept the organizational changes that a viable agricultural sector requires, or whether they prefer to seek income in the highly subsidized sphere of public administration or tourism, and to treat agriculture as a secondary, part-time activity which merely supplements the main source of income. The evidence shown here is that a large proportion of the population has already chosen the second alternative' (1979b:15).

This is particularly true of the outer islands where there are more limited agricultural, and other, productive opportunities, and on several of which there is a slow and seemingly inexorable movement towards a situation where

the only formal employment on those islands is within the public service. Policies directed towards stabilising, or reducing, the level of public service employment are likely to be met with concern and disinterest.

The prospects of establishing radical, or any other, development policies in the Cook Islands are also severely constrained by the obvious problems of achieving any form of balanced development in such a widely-scattered group of small islands (half of which are atolls) where transport costs are rapidly rising, thus increasing both the costs of marketing and the costs of providing health, education and other services, especially in the northern group. Development trends in the northern group are of particular interest; discussing Penrhyn it was observed in the mid-1970s that, 'economic activity on the atoll is steadily declining to a level whereby it may no longer be practical or viable for a community to be maintained' (Brimble, 1976, cited by Bellam, 1981:52) and, based on the 1976 census results, for the northern group as a whole, 'The Northern Cooks in particular looked as if they no longer had a population in 1976 capable of sustaining a reasonable life without major changes in social organisation which would probably be accompanied by stress conditions leading to further out-migration by the most able-bodied people. The future of small island communities in the Cooks, as in most other parts of the Pacific, looks bleak indeed' (Walsh, 1982:132). And yet, whilst similar conclusions have been made here for Palmerston (see above), these kinds of conclusions and predictions of contemporary depopulation have been made elsewhere in the South Pacific, most notably in Pitcairn (see Country Report No.15), but have continually been confounded by a reality in which population is ultimately retained there. Between 1976 and 1981 the population of Penrhyn increased as did that of the northern group as a whole. The reasons for this are unknown as are its effects (for example, on dependency rates, income levels, etc.) but its significance is apparent at a time when the prospects for development in the north appear to be worsening; on the one hand it may indicate that there are successful strategies for development on remote atolls but, on the other hand, it may reflect the emergence of a greater degree of inequality between north and south where the population of the north are economically constrained to remain. It is worthy of more detailed investigation.

The Cook Islands have a limited range of development options, but have choices between stronger ties with New Zealand and a greater degree of self-reliance, the option that in principal, but not in practice, has been adopted as the more appropriate development strategy. For most of this century Cook Islanders have had a high standard of living, growing expectations of New Zealand standards, unrestricted access to New Zealand, a history (and philosophy) of migration and increasing numbers of relatives in New Zealand; in a sense there has been a shift in 'emotional balance' (P.Macdonnell, pers. comm., 1981), assisted by an educational system oriented to New Zealand (in content and timing) and the establishment of a large overseas population from the Cook Islands in New Zealand. An emphasis on self-reliance and autonomy would result in lower government revenues in the short-term and hence presents real difficulties in supporting the present political and administrative system (and especially the relatively high and increasing salaries in the public service) whereas continuation of an outwardly directed strategy - highlighted by tourism and marine and agricultural exports - enhances ties with New Zealand and is likely to result in continued emigration. As Hayes concludes, 'in the short-run the continuation of an outwardly directed policy seems inevitable' (1982a: 392) so that the rhetoric of self-reliance cloaks the reality of further

incorporation and integration into the New Zealand (and global) economy. The kinds of macro-economic and social policies that are required to achieve development with a stable or growing population appear to be beyond the capacity of the Cook Islands alone to implement even if the will to do so existed.

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